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XI. TORTS
A. Spell v. McDaniel: Spelling Out Two Theories of Municipal
Liability for Incidents of Police Misconduct
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983)
imposes civil liability upon any person who, in acting pursuant to state
authority, deprives another person of his constitutional rights.' Prior to
1978 municipalities2 enjoyed immunity from section 1983 actions because
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)(any person who, in acting pursuant to state authority,
deprives another person of his constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities is liable to injured
party); see also Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)(section 1983
of United States Code generally makes every person liable for conduct that deprives any citizen
of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by United States Constitution); Note, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983: The Failure to Act as "Custom or Policy," 29 WAYNE L. REv.
1225, 1226 (1983)[hereinafter Note, Failure to Act](section 1983 of United States Code provides
federal remedy for deprivation of citizens' constitutional rights by persons acting under color
of state law). Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983) originated in
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Civil Rights Act). Note, Failure to Act, supra, at
1226. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which popularly was known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act, in an effort to combat racism and to provide equal rights to black citizens during the
post Civil War Reconstruction period. See Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 151, 154
n.14 (1986)(discussing legislative history of § 1983). Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act,
recognized that the act was essential in enforcing the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution because state authorities either were unable or unwilling to control the
widespread violence of the Ku Klux Klan. See G. PRATT, M. REAL & M. ScsnwARTz, SECTION
1983 CIVu. RIGHTS LTGATION: DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDs, AND PROBLEMS 16 (1985)(discussing
legislative history of § 1983). Although the violent conduct of the Klan provided the incentive
for legislative action, Congress did not enact section 1 of the Civil Rights Act to provide a
remedy against the Klan or its members. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961)(discussing
congressional intent underlying § 1983). Instead, Congress acted to provide a federal remedy
against state officials who were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law protecting an
individual's constitutional rights. Id. at 175-76. Moreover, Congress did not limit a cause of
action under section 1983 to black citizens or to conditions in the South, but rather extended
the cause of action to official violations of all federal rights. Oliver, supra, at 155. The
legislative purpose of section 1983 is to enforce the constitution and to provide a federal
remedy for all forms of official violations of federally protected rights. Note, Failure to Act,
supra, at 1226. See generally S. NA-MOD, Crvn Rirrs & Crvn LIBERTIES LITIGATION 4-5
(1986)(discussing legislative history of § 1983).
Although section 1983 creates a remedy for official violations of federally protected rights,
Congress did not intend for section 1983 to create substantive rights. See Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618-20 (1979)(language and legislative history of § 1983
clearly indicates that § 1983 does not create substantive rights). Accordingly, plaintiffs bringing
section 1983 actions must establish that the official act complained of violated their constitu-
tional or federal statutory rights. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816-17
(1985)(plurality opinion)(plaintiff must establish deprivation of constitutional right before
bringing action under § 1983). See generally Friedman, Constitutional Rights, in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECTION 1983 CrvI RiGHTS LmTIATION 291, 293-310 (1984)(listing constitu-
tional and statutory rights that are actionable under § 1983).
2. See Monel v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (term "munic-
ipality" under § 1983 refers to all types of local government units).
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the United States Supreme Court determined that municipalities were not
"persons" within the meaning of section 1983.1 In 1978, however, the
Supreme Court abolished municipal immunity from section 1983 actions.
4
After reevaluating the legislative history of section 1983, the Supreme Court
determined that a municipality is a person under section 1983 and is subject
to liability for constitutional violations that result from municipal customs
or policies.' The Court, however, refrained from presenting concise defini-
3. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) (Congress did not intend term
"person" in Civil Rights Act to include municipalities). In Monroe v. Pape the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the unconstitutional conduct of a municipality's police
officers renders that municipality liable under section 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-69. The
plaintiffs, black parents and their children, sued the city of Chicago and several of the city's
police officers, alleging that the officers, in acting pursuant to state authority, violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 169. Specifically, the plaintiffs' alleged that the police
officers violated their constitutional rights by breaking into and searching the plaintiffs' home
without a warrant, by making the plaintiffs stand naked while the police searched their house,
and by detaining and questioning the plaintiff father at the police station without allowing the
father to communicate with his family or his lawyer. Id. at 169-70.
Addressing the plaintiffs' claim against the city of Chicago, the Court in Monroe examined
the legislative history of section 1983 to determine whether a municipality was a suable
"person" under section 1983. Id. at 187-91. The Court initially noted that the Civil Rights
Act was the forerunner to section 1983. Id. at 170-71. The Court then examined Congress'
rejection of the Sherman Amendment, which sought to hold municipalities liable for certain
lawless acts within the municipalities' borders. Id. at 188-90. After reviewing the congressional
debate on this proposed amendment, the Court determined that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment because Congress doubted that the legislature had the constitutional power to
subject a municipality to civil liability. Id. at 190. The Court concluded that this legislative
rejection evidenced Congress' intent to exclude municipalities from the term "person" as used
in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 191. Accordingly, the Court in Monroe held that
the city of Chicago was not a suable "person" under section 1983. Id. at 192. See generally
Oliver, supra note 1, at 155-57 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Monroe); Note,
Municipal Liability After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: A Single Incident of Police
Misconduct May Establish Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 When Based on
Inadequate Training or Supervision, 20 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 551, 551 n.3 (1986)[hereinafter
Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle](same).
After the Supreme Court established municipal immunity from section 1983 actions,
commentators argued that the Supreme Court's determination that a municipality was not a
suable person under section 1983 constituted an inaccurate reading of the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 785-88 (1975)(arguing that legislative history of § 1983
indicates that Congress intended term "person" in Civil Rights Act to include municipalities);
Kates, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 131, 132-36 (1972)(same); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 55 MINN. L. Rav. 1201, 1205-07 (1971)(same); see also Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C.L. Rv. 517,
525-29 (1987)(reviewing criticism of Monroe's rejection of municipal liability under § 1983).
4. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)(legislative
history of § 1983 indicates that municipality is suable "person" under § 1983); see also infra
notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Monell).
5. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (1978)(municipalities are liable under § 1983 if execution
of municipal policy or custom injures plaintiff); see also infra notes 50-62 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Monell).
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tions of municipal policies or customs that would render municipalities liable
under section 1983.6 Accordingly, courts have struggled in their attempts to
define the limits of municipal liability under section 1983. 7 In particular,
courts have struggled to determine whether municipalities should be liable
for incidents of unconstitutional police conduct. 8 In Spell v. McDanieP the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether
a municipal police officer's use of excessive force against an arrestee renders
a municipality liable under section 1983.10
In Spell the defendant police officer, Charles McDaniel, arrested the
plaintiff, Henry Spell, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, for driving while
impaired and for possession of a controlled substance." After arresting
Spell, McDaniel brought Spell to Fayetteville's Law Enforcement Center to
6. See Monell, 463 U.S. at 695 (refusing to determine full contours of municipal liability
under § 1983); see also Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy
or Custom," 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 304 (1979)(Court in Monell did not define kind of
"official policy" or "governmental custom" that would render municipalities liable under §
1983); infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Monell).
7. See Penland & Boardman, Section 1983-Contemporary Trends in the Police Miscon-
duct Arena, 20 IDAHo L. Rlv. 661, 679 (1984)(discussing courts' struggle to determine meaning
of policy and custom in municipal liability cases); Note, Failure to Act, supra note 1, at 1229
(discussing courts grappling with implications of Monell's definitions of "policy" and "custom"
in determining municipal liability under § 1983); Comment, Liability of a Municipality for
Acts Committed by its Police Officers: Inadequate Training Demands Strict Custom or Policy
Test, 53 U. CiN. L. Rv. 525, 527-28 (1984)(discussing courts' struggle to determine meaning
of policy or custom in § 1983 municipal liability cases after Monell); see also infra notes 68-
101 and accompanying text (illustrating courts' conflicting approaches to determining municipal
liability for police misconduct).
8. See Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 554-55 (because of lack
of guidance from Supreme Court, courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether to hold
municipalities liable for acts of municipal police officers); see also infra notes 68-101 and
accompanying text (discussing courts' conflicting approaches to determining municipal liability
for falling adequately to train police force). Compare Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d
801, 804 (1st Cir. 1985)(evidence establishing gross negligence in training municipal police force
renders municipality liable under § 1983), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987) with
Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983)(in absence of evidence establishing
pattern of misconduct, evidence establishing subordinate official's gross negligence in failing
to train municipal police force does not render municipality liable under § 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
9. 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Jan. 19,
1988)(No. 87-855).
10. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W.
3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855).
11. Spell v. McDaniel, 616 F. Supp. 1069, 1075 (E.D.N.C. 1985). In Spell v. McDaniel
Spell admitted that he was under the influence of alcohol and quaaludes at the time Officer
McDaniel arrested Spell in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1383. Moreover,
at the time of Spell's arrest, Officer McDaniel discovered quaaludes in Spell's automobile. Id.
Spell later pled guilty to a charge of possession of quaaludes, a charge which existed in a
multi-count indictment that included two counts of narcotics trafficking. Id. at 1384 n.l.
Subsequently, a jury convicted Spell for narcotics trafficking and sentenced Spell to seven
years in prison. Id. When Spell brought his section 1983 action against Officer McDaniel and
the city of Fayetteville, Spell was serving the seven-year sentence for narcotics trafficking. Id.
1988]
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subject Spell to sobriety tests and arrest procedures.' 2 McDaniel then trans-
ported Spell to the Fayetteville Police Department.1 3 At the police depart-
ment, McDaniel, without justification or provocation, kneed Spell in the
groin.' 4 McDaniel's assault ruptured Spell's right testicle, necessitating its
surgical removal and rendering Spell irreversibly sterile.15 Subsequently, Spell
brought a section 1983 action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina against numerous defendants, including
McDaniel and the city of Fayetteville, North Carolina (the City).'
6
In his section 1983 action against McDaniel and the City, Spell alleged
that McDaniel, in acting in his capacity as a municipal police officer,
violated Spell's fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights under the
United States Constitution by using excessive physical force against Spell.'
7
Spell alleged that the City was liable under section 1983 because McDaniel
was acting pursuant to a municipal policy or custom when McDaniel violated
Spell's constitutional rights. 8 McDaniel, in defense to the individual-capacity
claim against him, denied that he had kneed Spell.' 9 Additionally, the City
denied that McDaniel had injured Spell and, alternatively, alleged that the
12. Spell, 616 F. Supp. at 1075.
13. Id.
14. Id. In Spell the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that
Spell's failure to answer McDaniel's questions may have caused McDaniel to beat and kick
Spell. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1383. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit maintained that Spell did not
physically provoke McDaniel to assault Spell. Id.
15. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W.
3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); see Spell v. McDaniel, 606 F. Supp. 1416, 1419
(E.D.N.C. 1985)(discussing details of Spell's injury).
16. Spell, 616 F. Supp. at 1075. In addition to naming Officer McDaniel and the city
of Fayetteville as defendants in his section 1983 action, the plaintiff in Spell named several
other parties as defendants. Id. These additional defendants included the Fayetteville City
Manager, the Fayetteville Chief of Police, the director of the police department's Internal
Affairs Division, and two police department command sergeants. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1384.
Spell structured his section 1983 action as an action against McDaniel in his individual and
official capacities, against the City Manager, the Police Chief, the Internal Affairs Division
Director, and the two command sergeants in their official capacities, and against the city as
a suable municipal corporation. Id.
17. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1384. In Spell, in addition to claiming that McDaniel's conduct
deprived Spell of his fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights, Spell asserted that
McDaniel had deprived him of his rights under the eighth amendment and the privileges and
immunities clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1384 n.3. The Unitqd States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed these two additional bases of
section 1983 liability. See Spell v. McDaniel, 616 F. Supp. 1069, 1076 n.4 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
18. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1384. In Spell the plaintiff contended that the City was liable
under the doctrine of Monell v. Department of Social Services, for any unconstitutional
conduct of its employees that was pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Id.; see Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)(municipalities are liable under § 1983
if execution of municipal policy or custom causes constitutional violation); infra notes 50-62
and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Monell).
19. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1384. In Spell McDaniel contended that Spell ruptured his testicle
prior to his arrest by falling on a rock or log on a riverbank. Spell v. McDaniel, 604 F. Supp.
641, 647 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
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facts failed to render the City liable under section 1983 for the conduct of
its employee McDaniel. 20 At trial before the district court, a jury determined
that McDaniel, in his individual capacity, and the City, through its super-
visory officials, were jointly and severally liable to Spell under section
1983.21 Subsequently, McDaniel and the City appealed the jury's decision
to the Fourth Circuit.=
On appeal the Fourth Circuit in Spell considered whether incidents of
police brutality can result in municipal liability under section 1983.3 The
Fourth Circuit initially recognized that a municipality will be liable to an
individual only if the execution of a municipal policy or custom causes that
20. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W.
3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855). In addition to claiming that the plaintiff's allegations
failed to state any cognizable claim for relief under section 1983, one of the defendants in
Spell, the city of Fayetteville, asserted several other grounds for dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint. Spell, 616 F. Supp. at 1076. These additional grounds for dismissal included
allegations that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiff's
complaint was conclusory and lacked sufficient factual allegations, and that the plaintiff's
claims amounted to claims against tortious conduct for assault and battery. Id. Moreover, the
City raised several affirmative defenses including absolute immunity and good faith immunity.
Id. By memorandum opinion and order dated July 11, 1984, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the City's motions, except the City's motion
to dismiss Spell's request for punitive damages against the City. Id.
21. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1385. In Spell the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina submitted two issues of liability to the jury for consideration. Spell,
616 F. Supp. at 1078. First, the district court asked the jury to consider whether McDaniel
had assaulted Spell by kneeing him in the testicles and whether McDaniel's assault proximately
had caused Spell's injury. Id. Second, the district court asked the jury to consider whether
Spell had established a basis for imposing liability upon the City for the constitutional violations
that resulted from McDaniel's assault. Id. After finding McDaniel and the City jointly and
severally liable to Spell for violating Spell's constitutional rights, the jury assessed damages of
one thousand dollars against McDaniel and the City. Id.
22. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1385. Prior to appealing the jury's decision to the Fourth Circuit,
the defendants in Spell made several unsuccessful post-trial motions. See Spell v. McDaniel,
616 F. Supp. 1069, 1078-80 (E.D.N.C. 1985)(discussing defendants' post-trial motions). First,
the defendants made a motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict and for a new
trial. Id. at 1078-79. The district court, however, rejected the defendants' motion, but granted
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. Id. at 1078-79. Second, after
the jury, on retrial, awarded Spell $900,000.00 in compensatory damages, the defendants made
a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. Id. at
1079. By order filed April 18, 1985, the district court denied defendants' post-verdict motion
after finding substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. The district court then
awarded Spell $335,942.57 in attorney fees and costs. Id. at 1115. Subsequently, the district
court entered joint and several judgments against McDaniel and Spell on the damage and
attorney fee awards. See Spell, 824 F.2d at 1385 (noting district court's entry of joint and
several judgments against McDaniel and City).
23. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1385. In addition to considering the issue of municipal liability
under section 1983 for incidents of police brutality, the Fourth Circuit in Spell considered
whether the district court erred in ordering a new trial on damages alone after setting aside
the first jury verdict, in making various evidentiary rulings, and in awarding unreasonably
excessive attorney fees to Spell as a prevailing party under section 1983. Id.
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individual to suffer damages that result from an incident of police brutality.24
The Spell court noted that the essential inquiry in imposing municipal
liability under section 1983 is to determine whether the municipality directly
was at fault for the alleged constitutional violation.2 - After recognizing the
need to establish direct municipal fault for constitutional violations, the
Fourth Circuit adopted two alternative theories for establishing municipal
liability under section 1983 for incidents of unconstitutional police conduct. 26
The Fourth Circuit in Spell first adopted the deficient training policy
theory for establishing municipal liability under section 1983.27 The Spell
court initially determined that the manner in which a municipality trains its
police force, including the design and implementation of training programs
and the follow-up supervision of trainees, constitutes an actionable municipal
policy under section 1983 . 28 The Fourth Circuit recognized that, under the
deficient training policy theory, a municipality is liable under section 1983
if deficiencies in an official training policy cause municipal police officers
to violate a person's constitutional rights. 29
The Spell court explained that, to hold a municipality liable under the
deficient training policy theory, a plaintiff must satisfy several critical
elements.3 0 The Fourth Circuit determined that a plaintiff first must show
that municipal policymakers designed or implemented a deficient training
policy.' Second, the Spell court required that a plaintiff desiring to hold a
24. Id. In Spell the Fourth Circuit presented a detailed review of Supreme Court decisions
that have established a general analytical framework for determining municipal liability under
section 1983. Id. at 1385-89. The Fourth Circuit began its review by noting that the Supreme
Court expressly has rejected the use of respondeat superior theories to hold a municipality
liable under section 1983. Id. at 1385 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 692-94 (1978)); see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Monell's rejection
of respondeat superior theories). The Fourth Circuit noted that, instead, the Supreme Court
has limited municipal liability under section 1983 to cases in which the execution of a
municipality's policy or custom causes the plaintiff's injury. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1385. The Spell
court then reviewed the Supreme Court decisions that presented general definitions of the
terms "municipal policy" and "municipal custom" as used in the context of section 1983
liability. Id. at 1385-88.
25. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1387 n.7.
26. See id. at 1388-91 (defining parameters of deficient training policy theory and
condoned custom or usage theory); see also infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text (discussing
Spell court's adoption of deficient training policy theory and condoned custom or usage
theory).
27. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389-90.
28. Id. at 1389.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1389-90; see infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's
requirements for holding municipalities liable under deficient training policy theory).
31. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390. In Spell the Fourth Circuit identified municipal policymakers
as those officials to whom a municipal governing body effectively has delegated final authority
to design and implement the municipality's training policy. Id. The Spell court explained that
a municipality may delegate final authority to subordinate municipal officials by a formal
directive or job description, by an informal acquiescence in a known, continued exercise of
authority, or by both in combination. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that a municipality
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municipality liable under the deficient training policy theory must show that
the municipality is directly at fault for the deficiencies in its training policy.
2
The Spell court explained that a municipality is directly at fault for a
deficient training policy if the deficiencies result from a municipal policy-
maker's deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for a person's
constitutional rights.33 Last, the Spell court determined that a plaintiff must
establish a close causal connection between a specific training deficiency
and the specific constitutional violation at issue.34 The Spell court explained
that a plaintiff must show that a specific training deficiency or deficiencies
rendered the occurrence of unconstitutional police conduct a reasonable
probability rather than a mere possibility.
35
After establishing specific guidelines for determining municipal liability
for a deficient training policy, the Spell court concluded that Spell had
provided sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict imposing municipal
liability under the deficient training policy theory.36 Specifically, the Spell
court noted that former and present members of the Fayetteville Police
Department had testified that the City's police officers received training in
the technique of kneeing or grabbing testicles to subdue arrestees or persons
in custody.3 7 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit maintained that police de-
partment records corroborated other testimony that specific instances of
cannot disclaim responsibility for the existence of an inadequate police training policy by
arguing that the municipal governing body retains ultimate but unexercised authority over
police training and policymakers who design and implement police training programs. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. In Spell the Fourth Circuit determined that mere negligence on the part of a
municipal policymaker in designing or implementing a training policy does not establish
municipal liability under the deficient training policy theory. Id. at 1390 n.11. The Fourth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, declined to decide the
issue of whether the mere negligence of municipal policymakers in training the municipality's
police force constitutes a sufficient degree of fault to impose municipal liability under section
1983. Id.; see City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1115-16 (1987) (declining to
consider City of Springfield's appeal on grounds that Court improperly granted city writ of
certiorari); see also infra note 101 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Kibbe). On the
authority of its prior holding in Wellington v. Daniels, the Fourth Circuit maintained that
"deliberate indifference" remained the minimal standard for holding a municipality liable
under section 1983 for deficient police training programs. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 n.11; see
Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983)(municipal omissions in police training
are actionable under § 1983 only if omissions constitute tacit authorization of or deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights). The Fourth Circuit in Spell explained that a municipality
is liable under the deliberate indifference standard if deficiencies in municipal police training
policies tacitly authorize constitutional violations or fail adequately to prohibit or discourage
readily foreseeable police misconduct. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390.
34. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390.
35. Id. In Spell the Fourth Circuit determined that a plaintiff who brings a section 1983
action against a municipality must show that a specific deficiency or deficiencies in a police
training program, rather than general laxness or ineffective training, caused unconstitutional
police conduct. Id.
36. Id. at 1391.
37. Id. at 1393-94.
1988]
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police brutality were frequent and that police department officials consis-
tently dismissed or disregarded the ensuing civilian complaints. 38 Finally,
the Spell court noted that a twenty-five year veteran of the City's police
department testified that the City's Chief of Police established his own
police academy to omit women and nonaggressive men so that he could
establish an aggressive police force. 39 In summarizing Spell's evidence in
support of the deficient training policy theory, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that inadequate police training and deliberate cover-up of police misconduct
encouraged Fayetteville police officers to engage in uses of excessive force
and, therefore, rendered the City liable under section 1983 for McDaniel's
unconstitutional conduct.4°
In addition to adopting the deficient training policy theory, the Fourth
Circuit in Spell adopted the condoned custom or usage theory for holding
a municipality liable under section 1983 for unconstitutional police conduct.
4'
The Spell court recognized that under the condoned custom or usage theory,
a municipality is liable under section 1983 if a plaintiff's injury resulted
from the failure of municipal policymakers to stop or correct a known,
widespread pattern of unconstitutional police conduct. 42
The Spell court determined that, to recover under the condoned custom
or usage theory, a plaintiff desiring to hold a municipality liable under
section 1983 must satisfy two critical elements.4 3 The Spell court maintained
that a plaintiff first must demonstrate that the municipality was at fault
for continuing widespread unconstitutional practices within the municipali-
ty's police department." The Fourth Circuit explained that a plaintiff must
show that a municipal policymaker had knowledge of widespread unconsti-
tutional police practices, but either intentionally or through deliberate in-
difference to citizens' constitutional rights failed to correct or stop those
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1393.
40. Id. at 1392, 1395. In concluding that deficient police training policies and deliberate
cover-up of police misconduct rendered the city of Fayetteville liable under section 1983, the
Fourth Circuit in Spell determined that the City had delegated final authority to establish
police training policy to the City's Chief of Police. Id. at 1394. The Spell court noted that
the official job description for the Chief of Police indicated that the city of Fayetteville had
delegated the authority to design and implement official police department policies to the Chief
of Police. Id. Moreover, the court noted that an expert in police administration had testified
that the City's Chief of Police established the City's official police department policies. Id.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit determined that the City's Chief of Police, in his capacity as
a municipal policymaker and with deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights,
established and implemented a deficient training program that rendered the City liable under
section 1983. Id. at 1395.
41. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390-91; see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing
Spell court's adoption of condoned custom or usage theory).
42. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390.
43. See id. at 1390-91 (discussing Spell court's requirements for holding municipality
liable under condoned custom or usage theory).
44. Id. at 1391.
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practices.4 5 Additionally, the Spell court determined that a plaintiff must
establish a close causal connection between the known but uncorrected
custom or usage of unconstitutional conduct and the specific constitutional
violation at issue in the plaintiff's section 1983 action.
46
After identifying the critical elements of the condoned custom or usage
theory, the Fourth Circuit in Spell concluded that Spell had provided
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict imposing section 1983 liability
under the condoned custom or usage theory.47 Specifically, the Spell court
determined that the evidence supported the conclusion that responsible
municipal officials deliberately failed to stop known practices of police
brutality and that McDaniel's assault was in furtherance of this condoned
custom or usage of excessive force. 48 Accordingly, after recognizing that the
evidence supported the imposition of municipal liability upon the City under
either the deficient training policy theory or the condoned custom or usage
theory, the Fourth Circuit in Spell affirmed the district court's judgment
on the merits against the City.
49
The Fourth Circuit based its adoption and application of the deficient
training policy theory and the condoned custom or usage theory on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social
Services.50 In Monell the Supreme Court considered wihether a municipal
45. Id. In Spell the Fourth Circuit determined that, to hold a municipality liable under
the condoned custom or usage theory, a section 1983 plaintiff must show that a'municipal
policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge of widespread patterns of unconstitutional
police misconduct within the municipality's boundaries. Id. The Spell court explained that a
plaintiff may establish constructive knowledge by submitting evidence indicating the extent of
the unconstitutional practices, a general knowledge of the practices existence, manifest oppor-
tunities for municipal policymakers to learn of the practices, and an official duty of policy-
makers to investigate such practices. Id. Moreover, the Spell court noted that the inculpating
knowledge may be the knowledge of the municipal governing body or of the municipal officials
having final policymaking authority in municipal law enforcement matters. Id.
46. Id. In Spell the Fourth Circuit noted that, to recover under the condoned custom
or usage theory, a section 1983 plaintiff must show that a municipal policymaker's failure to
stop a known pattern of unconstitutional police conduct rendered the occurrence of the
plaintiff's injury reasonably probable. Id.
47. Id.; see infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing evidence supporting jury
verdict imposing municipal liability under condoned custom or usage theory).
48. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1395. In Spell the Fourth Circuit made several critical factual
findings to hold the city of Fayetteville liable under the condoned custom or usage theory. Id.
First, the court noted that the Chief of Police, who had final authority and responsibility for
the supervision and discipline of municipal police officers, knew that municipal police officers
were engaging in widespread uses of excessive force. Id. Second, the Spell court found that
the City's Chief of Police and his authorized subordinates, in acting with deliberate indifference
to citizens' constitutional rights, condoned these unconstitutional practices by deliberately
covering-up police misconduct, by disregarding complaints of police misconduct, and by
positively encouraging police misconduct. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that, by condoning
these unconstitutional practices, the City's Chief of Police caused the practices to continue as
a municipal custom or usage. Id.
49. Id. at 1405.
50. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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regulation that compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid sick leave
before such leaves were medically necessary rendered New York City liable
under section 1983. 51 The plaintiffs, a class of New York City employees,
claimed that the city was liable under section 1983 because the mandatory
maternity leave policy violated their fourteenth amendment rights.5 2 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the Supreme Court's prohibition of section 1983 claims against munic-
ipalities barred the plaintiffs' claim against the city, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision. 3 After reevaluating the legislative history of section 1983, however,
the Supreme Court in Monell determined that municipalities, like New York
City, were suable "persons" under section 1983.
4
Although the Supreme Court in Monell abolished municipal immunity
from section 1983 actions, the Court limited a municipality's exposure to
51. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660-61 (1978). In Monell v.
Department of Social Services New York City regulations required pregnant employees to take
unpaid sick leaves after the fifth month of pregnancy unless a city physician and the head of
the employee's agency exercised their authority to allow a maximum of two additional months
of work. Id. at 661 n.2. The Commissioner of the Department of Social Services delegated
his discretion on ordering sick leaves to an assistant administrator. See Schnapper, Civil Rights
Litigation After Monell, 79 CoLum. L. Rav. 213, 220 (1979)(presenting details of New York
City's mandatory sick leave policy for pregnant employees). In the absence of written depart-
mental guidelines, the assistant administrator normally would decide whether to grant pregnant
employees work extensions partly on the basis of the importance of their jobs to the
Department. Id. See generally, Note, Failure to Act, supra note 1, at 1228-29 (discussing New
York City's mandatory sick leave policy for pregnant employees).
52. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
53. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)(Monroe holds that action for damages may not lie directly against municipality), aff'd,
532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also supra note 3 (discussing
Supreme Court's determination in Monroe v. Pape that Congress did not intend to include
municipalities within meaning of term "person" under § 1983).
54. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In Monell the
Supreme Court reconsidered its prior determination in Monroe v. Pape that municipalities
were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. Id. at 665-689; see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961)(Congress did not intend term "person" in Civil Rights Act to include
municipalities). The Supreme Court determined that the Court in Monroe incorrectly had
interpreted Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the Civil Rights Act as evidencing
an establishment of municipal immunity under section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669-89; see
supra note 3 (discussing content of proposed Sherman Amendment). Instead, the Court in
Monell determined that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment to refrain from imposing
an unconstitutional federal duty upon local units of government to create police forces and to
keep the peace. Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-79. Moreover, the Court noted that opponents to the
Sherman Amendment did not dispute Congress' authority to impose liability on a municipality
that breached a state imposed obligation to keep peace. Id. at 679-80. The Court in Monell,
therefore, concluded that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to impose civil
liability upon municipalities for municipal constitutional violations. Id. at 683, 690. Accord-
ingly, the Monell Court overruled Monroe and declared that Congress intended the term
"person" in section 1983 to include municipalities. Id. at 690-91.
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section 1983 liability." Finding that Congress intended to preclude section
1983 liability if a municipality did not cause the plaintiff's injury, the Court
in Monell expressly rejected the doctrine of respondeat superior as a basis
for imposing municipal liability under section 1983.56 The Court, however,
recognized two separate bases for establishing the necessary causal connec-
tion between a municipal act and the plaintiff's injury.5 7 First, the Court
in Monell determined that municipal liability arises if the execution or
implementation of a municipal policy causes unconstitutional conduct. 8 The
Court explained that a municipality's governing body or a municipal official
whose acts or edicts fairly may represent official policy may establish
actionable municipal policies under section 1983.- 9 Second, the Court in
Monell determined that a separate basis for imposing municipal liability
arises if a constitutional deprivation occurs pursuant to a municipal custom,
55. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694 (1978)(rejecting doctrine of respondeat superior as
basis for imposing municipal liability under § 1983); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 828 (1985)(Brennan, J., concurring)(recognizing that Court in Monell established
certain limits on theories of liability that § 1983 plaintiffs could assert against municipality);
Note, Failure to Act, supra note 1, at 1228 (Supreme Court has limited recognition of
municipal liability under § 1983); infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's holding in Monell that municipalities are liable under § 1983 only if municipal policy
or custom causes constitutional violation).
56. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. The Supreme Court in Monell based its rejection of the
doctrine of respondeat superior as a basis for imposing municipal liability on the language
and legislative history of section 1983. Id. at 691-95. The Court reasoned that the concept of
vicarious or indirect liability was inconsistent with the words "shall subject, or cause to be
subjected . . ." as those words appear in the text of section 1983. Id. at 691 (emphasis
omitted). Moreover, the Court reasoned that Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment,
which sought to hold municipalities liable for the actions of private individuals, indicated that
Congress did not intend to impose liability if a municipality was not at fault for the occurrence
of a constitutional violation. Id. at 693-94.
One Supreme Court Justice and numerous commentators have challenged the Supreme
Court's rejection of the doctrine of respondeat superior as a basis for imposing municipal
liability under section 1983. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-90
(1986)(Stevens, J., concurring)(arguing that § 1983's broad remedial purpose and § 1983's
embodiment of contemporaneous common-law doctrine mandate conclusion that Congress
intended to subject municipalities to respondeat superior liability); City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-844 (1985)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(arguing that language, legislative
history, and judicial interpretations of § 1983 mandate holding municipalities vicariously liable
for acts of employees); Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal
Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 416-19 (1978)(arguing against Supreme Court's
rejection of respondeat superior theories in § 1983 litigations against municipalities); Mead,
supra note 3, at 539-42 (same); Schnapper, supra note 51, at 215 n.15 (Supreme Court's
reasoning for rejecting respondeat superior rule is not persuasive); Note, Monell v. Department
of Social Services: One Step Forward and a Half Step Back for Municipal Liability Under
Section 1983, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 893, 919-21 (1979)(criticizing Suprbme Court's rejection of
respondeat superior as basis for imposing § 1983 liability upon municipalities).
57. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's determi-
nation that municipalities are liable under § 1983 if municipal custom or policy causes
constitutional violation).
58. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
59. Id.
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even though the custom does not receive formal approval from the muni-
cipality's official decisionmakers6 Finding New York City's mandatory
maternity leave requirement an unquestionable policy that violated plaintiffs'
constitutional rights, the Court in Monell reversed the lower court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' section 1983 action against New York City.61 Although
the Supreme Court recognized two alternative bases for establishing munic-
ipal liability, the Court expressly refrained from presenting detailed defini-
tions of municipal policies and customs that would render a municipality
liable under section 1983.62
Although, since Monell, the Supreme Court has continued to define the
scope of municipal liability under section 1983,63 courts continue to struggle
in their attempts to define the scope of municipal liability for unconstitu-
tional police conduct. 64 The Supreme Court has provided courts with some
60. Id. at 691. In Monell the Supreme Court described "customs" as persistent and
widespread discriminatory practices of state officials that become permanent and well-settled.
Id.; see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)(Congress included customs
and usages in § 1983 because persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state
officials become so permanent as to constitute custom or usage with force of law).
61. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. In finding that New York City's unconstitutional,
mandatory maternity leaves were a matter of official policy, the Supreme Court in Monell did
not disclose the facts that the Court believed established the unquestionable official policy.
Id.; see Schnapper, supra note 51, at 215 (discussing Monell's holding that city's mandatory
sick leave policy constituted official municipal policy). The Court in Monell did not indicate
whether the city's mandatory sick leave regulation or the city's assistant administrator's exercise
of discretion in ordering pregnant city employees to take sick leaves constituted an unques-
tionable official policy. See Note, Failure to Act, supra note 1, at 1229 (discussing Monell's
failure to explain manner in which city's mandatory maternity leave requirement constituted
official municipal policy); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing New York
City's regulation compelling maternity leaves).
62. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978)(refusing to
determine full contours of municipal liability under § 1983); see also Note, The Failure to
Act, supra note 1, at 1225 (Court in Monell did not explore contours of municipal "policy
or custom").
63. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)(plurality opin-
ion)(municipality is liable under § 1983 if municipal official, who has responsibility for
establishing final municipal policy, makes deliberate choice to follow course of action that
causes unconstitutional conduct); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985)(official's
defense of qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities in § 1983 actions); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260, 271 (1981) (municipalities are not liable
for punitive damages under § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1980)(section 1988
of Title 42 of United States Code permits payment of attorney fees to prevailing parties in §
1983 actions against municipalities); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51
(1980)(official's good faith defense is unavailable to municipalities in § 1983 actions). See
generally S. NA~mo , Cin. RIGHTS AND Clvin. LIBERTIES LmATION §§ 6.01-.09 (1986)
(reviewing recent § 1983 municipal liability cases); G. PRATT, M. REA. & M. SCHWARTZ,
SECTION 1983 CtvIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 1985: DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDS, AND PROBLEMS 490-93
(1985)(reviewing Supreme Court cases pertaining to municipal liability under § 1983).
64. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985)(because Supreme
Court decisions since Monell have failed to define the scope of Monell's "policy" or "custom"
standard, circuit court decisions highlight variety of questions that arise in determining
municipal liability under § 1983); see also infra notes 69-101 and accompanying text (discussing
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
guidance regarding the scope of municipal liability by establishing that proof
of a single incident of police misconduct, without additional proof of
municipal fault, fails to establish the existence of an actionable municipal
pblicy of inadequate police training.65 The Supreme Court's narrow deter-
mihation, however, has failed to provide courts with guidance on the issue
of whether a plaintiff, after showing that a defendant municipality main-
tained an inadequate training program, may recover damages against the
municipality for a municipal police officer's single act of brutality.6 Al-
though many courts have determined that inadequate police training con-
stitutes a viable basis for imposing municipal liability under section 1983,67
circuit courts' conflicting views on imposing municipal liability for unconstitutional police
conduct).
65. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)(plurality opin-
ion)(proof of single incident of unconstifutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability
under Monell). In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle the Supreme Court considered whether
proof of a single isolated incident of a police officer's use of excessive force establishes a
municipal policy sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under section 1983.
Id. at 814 n.2. The police officer in Tuttle shot and killed a man during the investigation of
a reported robbery at a bar. Id. at 810-11. The widow of the shooting victim in Tuttle sued
the police officer and the city of Oklahoma City, claiming that their actions violated her
husband's constitutional rights. Id. at 811. The plaintiff claimed that the city of Oklahoma
City was liable under section 1983 because the city inadequately trained municipal police
officers in the use of deadly force and that such inadequate training caused a municipal police
officer to deprive the plaintiff's husband of his constitutional right to due process. Id. at 812-
13. Specifically, the plaintiff in Tuttle claimed that the officer's conduct was so egregious that
the officer's conduct demonstrated that the city was grossly negligent or recklessly indifferent
in training its police officers. Id. at 820-21. Although the plaintiff offered expert testimony
that inadequate training procedures caused the officer's excessive and unconstitutional use of
force, the plaintiff did not offer any evidence that the officer or any other officer had'a
record of similar incidents of misconduct. Id. at 811-12. At trial before the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the jury returned a verdict against the
city, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict.
Id. at 813.
In reviewing the jury verdict against the city of Oklahoma City, the United States Supreme
Court focused on the trial court's instructions to the jury. Id. at 821-24. Specifically, the
Court in Tuttle, in a plurality opinion, expressed concern with the trial court's instruction that
the jury could infer from a single, unusually excessive use of force that the municipality had
adopted an inadequate training policy amounting to deliberate indifference or gross negligence.
Id. at 821. The Court reasoned that the jury instruction allowed a section 1983 plaintiff to
establish municipal liability without submitting proof that a municipal policymaker acted in a
manner that caused the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights. Id. at 821-24. Noting
that the Court in Monell intended to prevent the imposition of municipal liability if a plaintiff
could not attribute some wrong to a municipal policymaker, the Court in Tuttle concluded
that proof of a single incident of police misconduct, without additional proof of municipal
fault, cannot establish a municipal policy under section 1983. Id. at 823-24. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision to uphold the verdict against the city of
Oklahoma City. Id. at 824.
66. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 186 (1986)(Supreme Court has not decided whether
plaintiff may recover against municipality for single incident of police brutality upon showing
of inadequate training policy).
67. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 165 (most circuit courts have acknowledged that
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these courts have adopted conflicting tests for determining the type and
degree of proof that is necessary to render a municipality liable for main-
taining an inadequately trained police force. 68
Employing a narrow interpretation of Monell, some courts, unlike the
Fourth Circuit in Spell, require a plaintiff to prove a pattern of police
misconduct to establish municipal liability for an inadequately trained police
force. 69 For example, in Languirand v. Hayden,70 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required proof of a pattern of misconduct
resulting from inadequate police training as a prerequisite to imposing
municipal liability for an inadequately trained police force. 71 In Languirand
the Fifth Circuit considered whether a municipality's failure adequately to
train a police officer in the use of a pistol renders the municipality liable
inadequate police training renders municipality liable for resulting constitutional violations);
Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 556 n.21 (listing circuit courts that
have accepted or have indicated willingness to accept inadequate police training or supervision
as actionable municipal policy under § 1983); see also infra notes 69-101 and accompanying
text (discussing courts' approaches to holding municipalities liable for inadequate police
training).
68. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 165 (courts conflict regarding what constitutes official
policy or custom for purposes of proving actionable inadequate training); Note, Municipal
Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 556 (conflict has developed in circuit courts that accept
inadequate training or supervision as grounds for suing municipality under section 1983);
Comment, supra note 7, at 532-33 (courts addressing municipal liability for inadequately
trained police force have discussed whether test for liability should be test of custom, of
policy, or of both).
69. See Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1987)(plaintiff
bringing § 1983 action against municipality must show prior incidents of misconduct revealing
existence of unconstitutional custom); Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 125-26
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's claim of inadequate police training against city must include proof
of persistent, pervasive practice of unconstitutional conduct that is attributable to course that
official policymaking officials deliberately pursued); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d
1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1985)(even if failure to train single policeman causes that policeman to
violate § 1983 plaintiff's constitutional rights, plaintiff still must show that municipality's
failure to train the officer resulted from municipality's acquiescence in pattern of misconduct),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986); Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229-
30 (4th Cir. 1984) (municipality is not liable under § 1983 in absence of known, widespread
misconduct); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (municipality is not
liable for subordinate official's gross negligence in failing to train police officer in absence of
proof of similar incidents of misconduct), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). See generally
Oliver, supra note 1, at 165-68, 182-85 (discussing cases requiring plaintiff bringing § 1983
action against municipality to prove pattern of inadequate training or misconduct); Note,
Police Misconduct: Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 74 Ky. L.J. 651, 656-59 (1985-
86)[hereinafter Police Misconductl(discussing cases employing narrow application of Monell's
policy or custom test); Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 556-59 (discussing
cases requiring plaintiff to prove pattern of prior incidents of police misconduct to establish
municipal policy of inadequate training or supervision); Comment, supra note 7, at 532-33
(discussing cases employing narrow interpretation of Monell custom or policy test).
70. 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
71. Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1215 (1984); see infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand's approach
to imposing municipal liability for inadequate police training programs).
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under section 1983 for the officer's subsequent act of shooting a fleeing
criminal suspect.72 The municipal police officer in Languirand, believing
that an armed prowler was attempting to escape in the plaintiff's car, fired
two shots at the plaintiff's car.7 3 One of the officer's shots struck the
plaintiff in the base of the neck, which severally injured the plaintiff.74 The
plaintiff in Languirand subsequently brought a section 1983 action against
the municipality, claiming that the municipality's failure adequately to train
the defendant police officer in the use of a pistol caused the officer to use
excessive force in his attempt to apprehend the plaintiff.
75
At trial before the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi, the defendant police officer in Languirand testified that he
had not received formal training in the use of his weapon.76 Moreover, the
plaintiff in Languirand offered expert testimony to show that the defendant
officer did not receive adequate police training and that the lack of training
caused the officer to use excessive force against the plaintiff Y The plaintiff,
however, did not provide evidence establishing that a pattern of similar
incidents involving police officers using excessive force existed. 7 After the
district court found the city liable under section 1983 for the defendant
police officer's conduct, the city appealed to the Fifth Circuit2 9
The Fifth Circuit in Languirand initially rejected the theory that the
gross negligence of a subordinate municipal official, such as a city police
chief, in failing to train the municipality's police officer establishes an
actionable municipal policy. 0 Accordingly, the Languirand court determined
72. Id. at 222-23. In Languirand v. Hayden the plaintiff, John Languirand, and several
of his friends were driving and drinking beer in Pass Christian, Mississippi. Id. Responding
to his friends' requests to "relieve" themselves, Languirand stopped his car on an unlit gravel
road within the Pass Christian city limits. Id. Shortly thereafter, the defendant police officer,
John Hayden, spotted John Languirand's car parked next to the residence of a person who
had reported a prowler. Id. at 221. After getting out of his patrol car, Officer Hayden turned
on an overhead spotlight and aimed the light in the direction of Languirand's car. Id. Hayden
spotted one of Languirand's friends, John Foley, entering Languirand's car. Id. After spotting
a shiny object in Foley's hand, Hayden ordered Foley to stop. Id. As Foley proceeded to
enter the car, the car started to drive away. Id. Hayden allegedly spotted a shiny object inside
the car as the car drove away. Id. Fearing that the shiny object was a gun, Hayden twice
fired his .357 Magnum revolver at the left rear tire of Languirand's car. Id. During this time,
Languirand, the driver of the car, was bending over in the front seat to adjust the tape deck.
Id. Languirand claimed that he did not see or hear anything until the spotlight hit his review
mirror, at which time he heard two shots. Id. Officer Hayden's second shot struck Languirand
in the base of the neck, which caused severe permanent injury, including partial paralysis from
the chest down. Id. at 222.
73. Id. at 221.
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. at 222-23; see supra note 72 (discussing details of Officer Hayden's use of
excessive force).
76. Languirand, 717 F.2d at 228.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 229.
79. Id. at 222.
80. Id. at 227-28. In Languirand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
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that evidence establishing that a city inadequately had trained a single police
officer did not render the city liable under section 1983.1 Instead, the
Languirand court concluded that municipal liability under section 1983 for
the unconstitutional conduct of an inadequately trained police officer results
only if a plaintiff introduces evidence that establishes a custom of police
misconduct resulting from widespread inadequate training within the police
department. 82 Because the plaintiff failed to show that prior incidents of
police misconduct existed and that a significant number of municipal police
officers had received inadequate training, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court's judgment holding the city liable under section 1983.83
In contrast to the Languirand court's determination that inadequate
training constitutes an actionable municipal custom that requires proof of
a pattern of inadequate training and prior incidents of police misconduct,
other courts have determined that inadequate training constitutes an action-
able municipal policy that does not require proof of a pattern of miscon-
duct. 4 Courts that view inadequate training as a municipal policy allow
plaintiffs to establish municipal liability with evidence of a single incident
of unconstitutional police conduct, provided that the unconstitutional con-
duct resulted from an inadequate training policy that amounted to gross
negligence or deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights.8" For
Circuit noted that courts imposing municipal liability under the inadequate training policy
theory, which does not require proof of a pattern of police misconduct, represent the most
expansive view of Monell's standard for imposing municipal liability under section 1983. Id.
at 225.
81. Id. at 228-30.
82. Id. at 227-28.
83. Id. at 230. In reversing the district court's decision imposing municipal liability upon
the city of Pass Christian, the Fifth Circuit in Languirand concluded that no evidence
demonstrated that the city had a policy or custom of placing armed officers on the streets
who lacked adequate training, skill, and experience in the use of fire arms. Id. at 229. In
reaching its conclusion, the Languirand court noted that the plaintiff did not introduce evidence
of any other incident of police misconduct. Id. at 228-29. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the plaintiff did not introduce evidence that anyone on the police force, other than
Hayden, lacked sufficient skill, training, and experience to qualify for or to perform adequately
the position that he held. Id.
84. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text (discussing courts that view inadequate
police training as actionable municipal policy).
85. See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1263 (8th Cir. 1987)(municipality is
liable under § 1983 if municipality fails to train police force or adopts policy of training police
force in grossly negligent manner that renders police misconduct inevitable); Bergquist v.
County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986)(policy of gross negligence in training
or supervising gives rise to § 1983 liability); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 974-75 (1st
Cir. 1986)(municipality is liable under § 1983 for policy of failing to implement training
program or for policy of implementing program grossly inadequate to prevent unconstitutional
conduct); Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 810 (1st Cir. 1985)(municipality is liable
under § 1983 for policy of inadequate training amounting to gross negligence in training),
cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987); Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985)
(even if only single incident of police misconduct occurred, actionable municipal custom exists
if municipality fails to train or is grossly negligent in training its police force), cert. denied,
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example, in Kibbe v. City of Springfield8 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether a municipality is liable
under section 1983 for its gross negligence in the training of its police
officers.8 7 In Kibbe a municipal police officer, pursuing a motor vehicle,
shot and killed the plaintiff's husband. 88 In her section 1983 action against
the municipality, the plaintiff in Kibbe alleged that the city's gross negligence
in training its police officers constituted an actionable municipal policy
under section 1983.89 Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the city's policy
of inadequate training caused the officer to deprive her husband of his civil
rights.90 At trial before the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing a pattern of
similar incidents of police misconduct.9' Instead, the plaintiff provided
evidence relating to the police department's training policies, rules, and
107 S. Ct. 1369 (1987); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1985)(municipality is
liable under § 1983 for gross negligence in failing to train police officers); Voutour v. Vitale,
761 F.2d 812, 820-22 (1st Cir. 1985)(municipality is liable under § 1983 if municipal police
chief demonstrates at least gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Hayes v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.)(municipality
is liable under § 1983 if municipality fails to train police officers or if training is so reckless
or grossly negligent that future police misconduct is inevitable), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833
(1982). See generally Oliver, supra note 1, at 164-68, 183-84 (discussing cases holding munic-
ipality liable for inadequate training policy); Note, Police Misconduct, supra note 69, at 659-
63 (discussing cases that do not require § 1983 plaintiff to prove pattern of police misconduct);
Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 556-70 (discussing cases imposing
municipal liability for inadequate training policy); Comment, supra note 7, at 530-32 (same).
86. 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987).
87. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-03 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed,
107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987).
88. Id. at 802-803. In Kibbe v. City of Springfield the defendant city of Springfield's
police department received a series of emergency phone calls complaining that the plaintiff's
husband, Clinton Thurston, was violating a restraining order. Id. at 802. Responding to these
calls, city police olficers learned that Thurston had abducted Pamela Etter and had driven off
with her in his car. Id. at 802. These police officers initiated a chase in an attempt to stop
Thurston's vehicle, and two other officers set up a road block ahead of the chase. Id. As
Thurston passed the road block, one of the officers fired his weapon, nicking the left rear
wheel of Thurston's car. Id. After Thurston failed to stop at a second road block, a city
police officer on a motorcycle drove alongside Thurston's vehicle and fired two shots at
Thurston, apparently hitting Thurston with the second shot. Id. at 802-03. After Thurston's
car rolled to a stop, a police officer, who did not realize that another police officer had shot
Thurston, ordered Thurston to get out of his car. Id. at 803. After Thurston failed to emerge
from his car, the officer struck Thurston on the head with a flashlight and, with the assistance
of several officers, dragged Thurston from the car. Id. After handcuffing Thurston, the police
brought Thurston to a hospital. Id. The officer who shot at Thurston did not report the
shootings to the street supervisor, and the officer who transported Thurston to the hospital
did not know that an officer had fired shots at Thurston. 'Id. After learning that Thurston
was in serious condition at the hospital, a police department street supervisor suggested that
doctors should check for a bullet wound. Id. Doctors then took x-rays which revealed that a
bullet had entered Thurston's brain. Id. Thurston died a short time later. Id.
89. Id. at 801, 809.
90. Id. at 801, 809-10.
91. Id. at 805-09.
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regulations. 92 After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the city
appealed to the First Circuit, arguing that a plaintiff must show a pattern
of police misconduct to establish municipal liability under section 1983. 93
The First Circuit in Kibbe initially recognized that a municipal policy
of gross negligence in police training constitutes a viable theory for imposing
municipal liability under section 1983. 94 The Kibbe court reasoned that gross
negligence in training establishes the necessary causal connection between
the municipal policy and a police officer's unconstitutional conduct. 95 The
First Circuit explained that gross negligence in police training renders
unconstitutional police conduct inevitable because properly trained police
officers would not resort to unconstitutional conduct in certain situations. 96
Moreover, the Kibbe court recognized that, after showing a policy of gross
negligence in training, a plaintiff does not have to show a pattern of police
misconduct to recover under section 1983. 97 The Kibbe court reasoned that
92. Id. at 807-809. In support of her allegation thaf the city maintained an inadequate
training policy, the plaintiff in Kibbe submitted evidence that the police department failed to
give its officers adequate training relating to the apprehension of fleeing suspects, including
the proper use of deadly force, roadblocks, sirens, and lights. Id. at 807-08. Moreover, the
plaintiff in Kibbe provided evidence indicating that the department maintained inadequate
investigative procedures that increased the likelihood of police officers shooting without
justification. Id. at 808-09.
93. See id. at 809-10 (discussing City of Springfield's claim that the triai judge inade-
quately instructed jury). In Kibbe the City of Springfield claimed that the jury charge was
inadequate because the charge failed to indicate that the jury could not base liability against
the city on an isolated incident of negligent training. Id. at 809. The trial court in Kibbe had
instructed the jury that municipal liability under section 1983 exists if a city's failure to train,
supervise, or discipline police officers is reckless or grossly negligent. Id. at 810. The city
claimed that the trial court in Kibbe should have instructed the jury to base municipal liability
for inadequate police training on a pattern of deliberate supervisory inaction and indifference.
Id. at 809-10.
94. Id. at 804. In Kibbe the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determined that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle does not prohibit
section 1983 actions based on the inadequate training policy theory. Id.; see City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)(plurality opinion)(proof of single incident of police
misconduct, without additional proof of municipal fault, is not sufficient to impose liability
under § 1983); see also supra note 65 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Tuttle). The
Kibbe court interpreted Tuttle as allowing a jury to draw inferences of municipal fault with
respect to claims of inadequate police training, provided that the evidence supporting the
inferences of municipal fault does not consist solely of a single incident of police misconduct.
Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 804-05. The First Circuit in Kibbe noted that the plaintiff did not limit
her evidence of municipal fault to evidence of a single incident of police misconduct. Id. at
805, 807. The court noted that the plaintiff in Kibbe provided additional evidence that concerned
the municipality's training procedures and the rules and regulations of the municipality's police
department. Id. at 805. Moreover, the Kibbe court maintained that Tuttle did not prohibit the
inference of municipal fault from the unconstitutional conduct of numerous police officers
during an single event. Id.
95. Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 804, 806 n.4.
96. Id. at 804. In Kibbe, the First Circuit noted that a plaintiff could introduce expert
testimony to establish the necessary causal connection between a municipal policy of gross
negligence in police training and unconstitutional police conduct. Id.
97. Id. at 806 n.4.
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a municipality exhibits deliberate indifference to its citizens' constitutional
rights if the municipality trains municipal police officers in a manner that
renders unconstitutional conduct inevitable. 98 Because such deliberate indif-
ference indicates that the municipality approved of and implicitly authorized
unconstitutional police misconduct, the First Circuit reasoned that a plaintiff
did not have to establish municipal acquiescence in a known pattern of
police misconduct. 99 Although conceding that the evidence concerning the
city's police training practices was sparse, the Kibbe court concluded that
a jury reasonably could have found that the city was grossly negligent in
training its police force and that the city's gross negligence caused the
premature use of deadly force against the plaintiff's husband. °° Accordingly,
the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to hold the city liable
under section 1983.101
98. Id.; see Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1978)(municipality
that trains police force in grossly negligent manner exhibits deliberate indifference to inevitable
unconstitutional police conduct).
99. Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 806 n.4.
100. Id. at 809. The First Circuit in Kibbe, in determining whether the evidence supported
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, noted that certain evidence indicated that the city was grossly
negligent in training its police force. Id. at 807-09. For example, the First Circuit explained
that the testimony of two officers indicated that the city's police department gave officers
virtually no guidance in apprehending suspects fleeing in motor vehicles. Id. Moreover, the
Kibbe court observed that the police department's own rules supported a finding of gross
negligence. Id. The court explained that the police department adopted rules that recognized
the importance of preventing the use of deadly force. Id. at 808. The Kibbe court, however,
noted that the department failed to train officers on methods of stopping a fleeing suspect
that did not involve the use of deadly force. Id. Accordingly, the Kibbe court reasoned that
the relationship between the department rules and the department's failure to train police
officer's enabled the jury properly to draw the inference that the police department made a
conscious policy decision not to employ rules of alternative training. Id. at 808-10. Finally,
the First Circuit observed that the involvement of ten officers and the numerous incidents of
misconduct in Kibbe supplied additional evidence of gross negligence in training. Id. at 805-
06.
101. Id. at 810. After the First Circuit in Kibbe affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant City of Springfield appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
alleging that a plaintiff must establish more than negligence in training to hold a municipality
liable under section 1983. See City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1115 (1987).
After initially granting certiorari to resolve the question of whether a municipality is liable
under section 1983 for a policy of negligent police training, the Supreme Court in Kibbe, in
a 5-4 majority, subsequently dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Id. at 1116. The
Kibbe majority explained that the city had failed to preserve the issue on appeal. Id.
Writing for the dissent in Kibbe, Justice O'Conner argued that the question of whether
a municipality is liable under section 1983 for a policy of negligent police training properly
was before the Court and that the Court should decide the issue on the merits. Id. Moreover,
Justice O'Conner elected to decide the issue on the merits and concluded that the "inadequacy"
of police training may serve as the basis for section 1983 liability only if the municipality's
failure to train amounts to reckless disregard for or deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons within the municipality's domain. Id. at 1119-21. Justice O'Conner explained that the
remote causal connection between an omission in a police training program and an individual
police officer's affirmative misconduct in a particular instance mandates the conclusion that
negligence in training alone is not sufficient to satisfy Monelfs causation requirement. Id.
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The Kibbe and Spell courts' determinations that inadequate police
training constitutes an actionable municipal policy are consistent with the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Monell.02 The Court in Monell determined
that municipal liability for a constitutional violation exists only if a plaintiff
shows that the municipality was at fault for the occurrence of the consti-
tutional violation.'0 3 Moreover, the Court in Monell recognized that munic-
ipal fault arises if a municipal policymaker adopts or promulgates a policy
that causes unconstitutional conduct. ' 4 Because municipal policy results
from a policymaker's decision to select a particular course of action, 05 the
manner in which a policymaker chooses to train municipal police officers
logically represents official municipal policy.3 6 A municipality, therefore,
Reviewing the evidence on the record, Justice O'Conner determined that the record failed to
present any evidence from which jurors reasonably could conclude that the city's training in
the apprehension of fleeing vehicles manifested recklessness or deliberate indifference. Id. at
1121. Accordingly, Justice O'Conner concluded that the Supreme Court should have reversed
the First Circuit and remanded the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the City of
Springfield. Id. at 1122.
102. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 183 (analysis of Monell reveals that inadequate training
is more consistent with concept of policy than custom); see also supra notes- 50-62 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Monell); infra notes 104-108 and
accompanying text (applying Monell to inadequate training policy theory).
103. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (municipalities
are not liable under § 1983 unless action pursuant to official municipal policy causes a
constitutional tort); see supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
reasoning in Monell); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985)(plurality
opinion)(section 1983 claim against municipalities requires fault-based analysis and proof that
municipal policy or custom caused plaintiff's injury); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387
n.7 (4th Cir. 1987)(direct municipal fault is essence of municipal liability under § 1983), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774
F.2d 1495, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985)(Johnson, J., dissenting) (courts should not impose municipal
liability under § 1983 if municipality is not at fault), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986);
Oliver, supra note 1, at 180 (purpose of Monell's policy or custom requirement was to insure
that a municipality was liable only if the municipality was at fault).
104. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)(municipality
is liable under § 1983 if unconstitutional conduct implements or executes policy officially
adopted and promulgated by governing body or by those whose acts and edicts represent
official policy); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986)(plurality
opinion)(Monell's official policy requirement is intended to distinguish acts of municipality
from acts of municipality's employees); supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's reasoning in Monel).
105. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)(plurality opinion)(if
municipal decisionmakers decide to adopt particular course of action, that decision represents
act of official government "policy"); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
(1985)(plurality opinion)(policy generally implies course of action that municipal policymakers
consciously chose to follow).
106. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829 (1985)(Brennan, J.,
concurring)(municipal policies include set of procedures for training and supervising police
officers); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th Cir. 1987)(training of municipal police
force, including design and implementation of training programs and follow-up supervision of
trainees, constitutes policy within meaning of Monell), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S.
Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); Goode, The Changing Nature of Local Governmental Liability
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will be at fault for a municipal police training policy if constitutional
violations are the foreseeable result of a policymaker's police training
decisions.107 Because constitutional violations are the foreseeable result of
training decisions that are grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent to
citizens' constitutional rights, the Kibbe court's gross negligence standard
and the Spell court's reckless disregard or deliberate indifference standard
for imposing municipal liability for inadequate police training satisfy Mo-
nell's municipal fault requirement. 08
In addition to satisfying Monell's municipal fault requirement for in-
posing municipal liability under section 1983, the Kibbe and Spell courts'
determinations that inadequate training constitutes an actionable municipal
policy promote the public policy considerations that Congress intended to
promote in enacting section 1983.109 Congress enacted section 1983 primarily
to provide compensation to all persons who suffer deprivations of their
Under Section 1983, 22 URAN. L. ANN. 71, 92 (1981)(because police departments generally
have authority to train individual officers, manner in which police department chooses to train
police officers constitutes type of act that represents official policy).
107. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 832 (1985)(Brennan, J.,
concurring)(municipalities are liable under- § 1983 for constitutional violations that are fore-
seeable result of municipal police training policies); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495,
1512 (1985)(Johnson, J., dissenting) (municipal fault arises if constitutional violations are
foreseeable result of policymaker's decision to establish particular policy), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1970 (1986); Mead, supra note 3, at 556 (because inadequate police training creates
tremendous potential for unconstitutional police conduct, municipality is at fault for conduct
of inadequately trained police officers); Oliver, supra note 1, at 183 (if municipality chooses
to pursue training in area or not to pursue training, city bears responsibility if policy choice
causes a constitutional violation); Note, Police Misconduct, supra note 69, at 666 (holding
municipality ultimately responsible for police misconduct if municipality fails to minimize
foreseeable unconstitutional police conduct is consistent with policy underlying municipal
liability); Note, Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 573 (municipality clearly is
at fault if municipal policymaker chooses inadequate training methods that cause a constitu-
tional violation).
108. See City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1119-21 (1987)(O'Conner, J.,
dissenting)(courts should permit juries to find that municipality's inadequate training caused
constitutional violation if inadequacy of training amounts to deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard for consequences); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1512 (11th Cir.
1985)(Johnson, J., dissenting)(municipal policies that are grossly negligent or deliberately
indifferent to constitutional rights establish municipal fault for constitutional violations because
constitutional violations are foreseeable result of such policies), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970
(1986); see also supra notes 27-35, 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's and
Kibbe court's standards for imposing municipal liability for inadequate police training policies).
But see Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 825-26 (1985)(Bownes,J., concurring)(arguing that
simple negligence standard is sufficient to impose municipal liability under § 1983), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Goode, supra note 108, at 92 (same); Project, Suing the Police
in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.S. 781, 816-18 (1979)(arguing that courts should hold municipalities
strictly liable for actions of municipal police officers); Note, Failure to Act, supra note 1, at
1231-33 (discussing conflicting views on requisite mental state for imposing municipal liability
under § 1983).
109. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing public policy implications
of imposing municipal liability under theory of inadequate training policy).
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constitutional rights by persons acting pursuant to state authority.110 By
viewing inadequate training as an actionable municipal policy as opposed
to an actionable municipal custom, which requires proof of a pattern of
misconduct, the Kibbe and Spell courts provide compensation to the plaintiff
who is the first victim of an inadequate police training program.' The
Kibbe and Spell courts do not require citizens to endure a pattern of
unconstitutional police conduct, but rather provide redress to all persons
who suffer deprivations of their constitutional rights by police officers who
had received grossly negligent or indifferent training.'1 2 Accordingly, the
Kibbe and Spell courts promote the policy of section 1983 to provide redress
to all citizens who suffer a deprivation of their constitutional rights."3
Moreover, by holding a municipality liable for the first incident of
police misconduct that results from an inadequate training policy, the Kibbe
and Spell courts promote another policy of section 1983, which is to deter
future deprivations of constitutional rights." 4 The threat of monetary lia-
110. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982)(Congress intended §
1983 to provide federal remedy to all individuals who suffered deprivation of constitutional
rights); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1980)(courts should construe § 1983 generously
to further § 1983's primary purpose to provide damage remedy against party depriving another
of constitutional rights); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978)(policies under-
lying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and
prevention of abuse of power by individuals acting under color of state law); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978)(failure to compensate injuries that result from deprivation of
constitutional rights defeats purpose of § 1983); Mead, supra note 3, at 545 (purpose of §
1983 was to provide redress to all persons deprived of their civil liberties); Schnapper, supra
note 51, at 243-44 (discussing remedial purpose of § 1983); see also supra note 1 (discussing
legislative intent of § 1983).
111. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff may establish
municipal fault and liability for first specific constitutional violation that results from proven
inadequate training policy), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855);
Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 806 n.4 (1st Cir. 1985)(plaintiff establishing policy
of gross negligence or deliberate indifference does not have to show pattern of police
misconduct), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987); see also Oliver, supra note 1, at 185 (if
plaintiff shows policymakers rendered inadequate training decision, plaintiff should recover
even if inadequate training decision results in one incident of police misconduct); Note,
Municipal Liability After Tuttle, supra note 3, at 578 (arguing that first victim of inadequate
police training policy can recover against municipality upon showing that police training
program was grossly deficient and that training deficiencies caused alleged constitutional
violation).
112. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987) (first victim of
municipality's inadequate police training policy can hold that municipality liable under § 1983),
cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); Kibbe v. City of Springfield,
777 F.2d 801, 806 n.4 (1st Cir. 1985)(plaintiff establishing policy of gross negligence or
deliberate indifference does not have to show pattern of police misconduct), cert. dismissed,
107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987).
113. See supra notes .110- 112 and accompanying text (discussing Spell and Kibbe courts'
promotion of legislative intent of § 1983); see also supra note 1 (discussing legislative history
of § 1983).
114. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)(section 1983 intended
not only to provide compensation to victims of constitutional violations, but to serve as
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bility for the first unconstitutional act of an untrained police officer operates
as an incentive for municipal policymakers to ensure that every police officer
receives adequate training that minimizes the possibility of unconstitutional
conduct."' The Kibbe and Spell courts' determinations that inadequate
training constitutes an actionable municipal policy that does not require
proof of a pattern of misconduct, therefore, promotes the remedial and
deterrent policies of section 1983.116
In contrast to the Kibbe and Spell courts' determinations that inadequate
training constitutes an actionable municipal policy, the Languirand court's
determination that inadequate training constitutes an actionable municipal
custom confuses Monell's municipal fault requirement and frustrates the
remedial and deterrent policies of section 1983.117 The Supreme Court in
Monell determined that evidence of a municipal policy or custom that causes
constitutional violations establishes municipal fault for those violations and
thus renders the municipality liable under section 1983.11s Analyzing inade-
quate police training as custom, however, confuses the manner in which
custom establishes municipal fault. 1 9 Establishing municipal fault in terms
deterrent against future constitutional violations); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-
91 (1978)(policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation
of federal rights and prevention of abuse of power by persons acting under color of state
law); Monroe v. Pape, 363 U.S. 167, 182-83 (1961)(Congress designed § 1983 to deter potential
violations of constitutional rights by providing victims with federal forum for enforcement of
their constitutional rights); see also Schnapper, supra note 51, at 244-45 (discussing deterrent
purpose of § 1983).
115. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980)(threat of damages may
encourage persons in policymaking positions to institute internal rules and programs designed
to minimize likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976)(White, J., concurring)(monetary liability for unconstitu-
tional conduct has desirable effect of deterring unconstitutional conduct); Mead, supra note
3, at 539 (holding municipalities liable for unconstitutional conduct of its employees encourages
municipalities to exercise care in training municipal employees); Comment, supra note 7, at
538 (threat of possible damages may encourage municipality to ensure that its police officers
receive adequate training).
116. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text (discussing Spell and Kibbe courts'
furtherance of remedial and deterrent policies of § 1983); see also supra note 1 (discussing
legislative history of § 1983).
117. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand court's approach
to imposing municipal liability for inadequate police training programs); see also infra notes
117-130 and accompanying text (discussing manner in which Languirand court confuses Monell's
municipal fault requirement and frustrates policies of § 1983).
118. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (municipality liable
under § 1983 if plaintiff shows that municipal policy or custom caused deprivation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights); supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
holding in Monell).
119. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 184 (analyzing municipal liability for inadequate police
training in terms of pattern of unconstitutional conduct by inadequately trained police officers
is inconsistent with manner in which municipal custom establishes municipal fault under §
1983); infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (explaining inconsistency in holding munici-
palities liable only for pattern of inadequate training or prior incidents of misconduct resulting
from inadequate training).
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of custom involves proof that municipal policymakers tacitly authorized or
encouraged uncdnstitutional conduct by failing to stop a known widespread
pattern of unconstitutional conduct. 120 Because inadequate training results
from faulty municipal policymaking, the requisite municipal fault already
exists and thus should not have to be further established by a municipal
policymaker's tacit approval of misconduct resulting from inadequate train-
ing. 121 By requiring proof of prior incidents of police misconduct that result
from a widespread and pervasive pattern of inadequate training, the Lan-
guirand court arguably requires a plaintiff to prove that a municipality had
maintained a custom of unconstitutional conduct and a policy of inadequate
police training to establish municipal liability under section 1983.122 Accord-
ingly, the Languirand decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
determination that municipal policy and municipal custom constitute two
separate bases for establishing municipal liability under section 1983. 12
In addition to constituting an improper application of Monell, the
Languirand court's approach to holding municipalities liable for incidents
of police misconduct frustrates the public policy considerations underlying
section 1983.124 By requiring a plaintiff to show a pattern of prior police
misconduct, the Languirand court fails to compensate those persons who
are the first victims of an inadequately trained police force. 25 Because the
120. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)(although not
authorized by written law, persistent and widespread discriminatory practices may become so
permanent and well-settled to constitute actionable municipal custom or usage); Spell v.
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that, under condoned custom or
usage theory, municipality is at fault for constitutional violations if municipal policymakers
deliberately or recklessly fail to stop known widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct),
cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); Harris v. City of Pagedale,
821 F.2d 499, 506 (8th Cir.)(policymaker's failure to take remedial action against known
pattern of police misconduct indicates municipal indifference to police abuses, which establishes
actionable municipal custom under § 1983), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 504 (1987); Oliver, supra
note 1, at 182 (pervasive and widespread incidents of misconduct establish actionable custom
of encouraging or acquiescing in unconstitutional conduct). See generally Note, supra note 6,
at 306-07 (discussing manner in which municipal customs render municipalities liable under §
1983).
121. See Oliver, supra note 1, at 184 (noting that, once plaintiff establishes inadequate
training policy, plaintiff need not establish municipal fault by showing municipal acquiescence
in unconstitutional acts of subordinates); supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (explaining
manner in which inadequate training decisions establish municipal fault for constitutional
violations).
122. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand court's approach
to imposing municipal liability for unconstitutional police conduct).
123. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding
in Monell that municipalities are liable under § 1983 for policies or customs that cause
constitutional violations).
124. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (explaining Languirand court's failure
to promote policy considerations underlying § 1983).
125. See Comment, supra note 7, at 536 (courts that require plaintiffs to establish pattern
of misconduct do not provide compensation to first victim of police officer who receives
inadequate training); see also supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand
court's failure to compensate plaintiff who was first victim of an inadequately trained police
officer).
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Languirand court requires a plaintiff to show a pattern of misconduct to
prove an actionable municipal custom, those plaintiffs who are the first
victims of inadequately trained police officers always would be unable to
prove the requisite pattern. 26 Accordingly, the Languirand court's approach
to imposing municipal liability for incidents of police misconduct frustrates
the primary policy of section 1983, which is to provide compensation to all
citizens who suffer a deprivation of their constitutional rights.1 27
In addition to frustrating the remedial policy of section 1983, the
Languirand court's approach to imposing municipal liability frustrates the
policy of section 1983 to deter constitutional violations. 28 By failing to hold
municipalities liable for the isolated unconstitutional acts of inadequately
trained police officers, the Languirand court does not encourage munici-
palities to correct training deficiencies that foreseeably result in unconsti-
tutional police conduct until those deficiencies actually cause a pattern of
constitutional violations. 29 Accordingly, by requiring a plaintiff to prove a
pattern of police misconduct that results from an inadequate training
program, the Languirand court frustrates both the remedial and deterrent
policies of section 1983.130
126. See Comment, supra note 7, at 536 (courts that require plaintiffs to establish pattern
of misconduct do not provide compensation to first victim of police officer who receives
inadequate training); see also supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand
court's failure to compensate plaintiff who was first victim of an inadequately trained police
officer).
127. See Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d'220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983)(municipality liable
under § 1983 for unconstitutional conduct of inadequately trained police officer only if plaintiff
proves a pattern of similar incidents of unconstitutional conduct), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215
(1984); supra notes 124-126 (discussing manner in which Languirand court frustrates remedial
policy of § 1983); see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
intent to provide compensation to all persons who suffer constitutional deprivations).
128. See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text (explaining Languirand court's failure
to deter constitutional violations); see also supra note 114 (discussing deterrent policy of §
1983).
129. See Languirand, 717 F.2d at 227-28 (municipality not liable under § 1983 unless
plaintiff shows pattern of police misconduct resulting from widespread inadequate police
training); supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Languirand court's approach
to holding municipality liable under § 1983 for incidents of police misconduct); see also supra
notes 114-116 (discussing deterrent value of exposing municipalities to monetary liability for
all constitutional violations resulting from inadequate police training program).
130. See Languirand, 717 F.2d at 227-28 (municipality not liable under § 1983 unless
plaintiff shows pattern of police misconduct resulting from widespread inadequate police
training); supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text (discussing manner in which Languirand
court's approach to holding municipalities liable for incidents of police misconduct frustrates
remedial and deterrent policies of § 1983); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 832 (1985)(plurality opinion)(Brennan, J., concurring)(policies of § 1983 do not support
rule that allows municipality to escape liability for first constitutional violation that results
from municipality's inadequate training policy). But see Comment, supra note 7, at 539
(arguing that public policy of protecting municipalities from potentially large damage awards
in § 1983 litigations requires plaintiffs desiring to hold municipality liable for inadequate police
training to prove pattern of past police misconduct). See generally Brown, Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of
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In Spell v. McDaniel the Fourth Circuit determined that a municipality
is liable under section 1983 for a municipal police officer's use of excessive
force against an arrestee.13 1 The Spell court adopted and carefully articulated
the scope of the deficient training policy theory and the condoned custom
or usage theory as two alternative theories for holding a municipality liable
under section 1983 for incidents of unconstitutional police conduct.1 37 This
dual approach to determining municipal liability for unconstitutional police
conduct is consistent with Supreme Court decisions concerning municipal
liability under section 1983133 and promotes the policy considerations that
Congress intended to promote in enacting section 1983.134 The Fourth
Circuit's diligence in defining the full details of each theory presents lawyers
with clear guidance on the allegations that a successful plaintiff must plead
and prove in a section 1983 litigation.1 35 Perhaps most importantly, however,
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Spell notifies municipalities that the law
does not tolerate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights.136
DAVID A. MCKAY
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati- The "Official Policy" Cases,
27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 891-92 (1986)(discussing argument that protection of municipalities'
financial stability requires judicial restraint in imposing § 1983 liability against municipalities).
131. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1405 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W.
3478 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-855); see supra notes 36-40, 47-49 and accompanying text
(discussing Spell court's holding that city of Fayetteville is liable under § 1983 for city police
officer's unconstitutional conduct).
132. See supra notes 27-35, 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's adoption
of deficient training policy theory and condoned custom or usage theory).
133. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's adherence
to Supreme Court's standard for imposing municipal liability under § 1983); see also supra
notes 50-65 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions concerning municipal
liability under § 1983).
134. See supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's promotion
of public policy considerations underlying § 1983).
135. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's adoption of
deficient training policy theory); supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing Spell
court's adoption of condoned custom or usage theory).
136. See supra notes 23-49 and accompanying text (discussing Spell court's adoption of
two theories that impose § 1983 liability upon municipalities that exhibit deliberate indifference
to or reckless disregard for unconstitutional police conduct).
B. Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc.: Sobering Judicial
Restraint on Dram Shop Liability in Virginia
Public outcry concerning the tremendous number of drunk-driving
fatalities and injuries has intensified during recent years.' Citizen groups
and, in turn, lawmakers have sought to reduce the number of drunk-driving
accidents as public concern has intensified. 2 As a result of this desire to
protect the public from drunk drivers, a majority of state courts have held
dram shops, which sell alcoholic beverages to consumers, liable for the
injuries that the dram shops' patrons inflict on third parties.3 Courts in
some jurisdictions have denied third party liability against dram shops based
solely on the common-law notion that only the act of consuming alcohol,
as opposed to the act of selling alcohol, proximately causes third party
injury.4 Other courts have interpreted state common law in conjunction with
state legislation that restricts the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons with
inconsistent conclusions regarding dram shop liability.5 In addition, some
I. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (expressing concern for
"tragic frequency" of drunk-driving accidents); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1979)
(expressing concern for drunk-driving highway fatalities); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (same); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (expressing general concern for increased volume of highway fatalities).
2. See War on Alcohol Abuse, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1984, at 63
(discussing effect of public concern for drunk-driving accidents). There has been a gradual
decline in the number of drunk-driving deaths occurring on the highways of the United States
during this decade. Id. The reduction in drunk-driving accidents, authorities assert, is due to
the influence of citizen groups on legislatures across the country. Id. In the past decade alone,
state legislatures have enacted over 223 new state statutes to reduce alcohol-related accidents.
Id.
3. Id. Groups trying to influence state legislatures and urging dram shop liability seek
to place responsibility on the tavern personnel, who, the lobbyists claim, are in a position to
prevent intoxicated customers from driving. Id. By 1984 the relationship between taverns and
their intoxicated customers has led 36 states to hold tavern owners liable for the torts of the
tavern's intoxicated patron. Id.
4. See Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 177, 438 A.2d 494, 496 (1981) (common-law rule
holds man who drank liquor liable, and considers act of selling liquor too remote to be
proximate cause of injury caused by negligent act of purchaser of drink). But see Rappaport
v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959) (tavern owner who sells alcoholic beverages
to person who is visibly intoxicated should recognize and foresee unreasonable risk of harm
to others through action of intoxicated person).
5. See Norwood v. Marrocco, 780 F.2d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that statute
restricting sale of alcohol to intoxicated person does not create dram shop liability cause of
action); infra notes 20, 23, 36 and accompanying text (discussing United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia's interpretation of Virginia statute restricting sale of alcohol
to intoxicated persons). In Norwood an injured person sought to recover against the nightclub
that had served alcohol to the injured person's attacker. Norwood, 780 F.2d at Ill. The
plaintiff alleged that the attacker's extremely intoxicated state caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Id. Thus, the plaintiff alleged that the bar's serving of alcohol to the attacker placed the
attacker in the condition that caused the assault. Id. The Norwood court interpreted section
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state legislatures have enacted dram shop legislation that specifically provides
for a third party cause of action against dram shops.6 In the absence of
state dram shop acts, however, courts have been free to arrive at varied
conclusions regarding dram shop liability. 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc.,8
considered whether dram shop liability exists if a state statute prohibits
dram shops from supplying alcohol to intoxicated persons. 91n Webb John
McCarthy and his friends began an evening of drinking at Valle's Restaurant
in Springfield, Virginia (Valle's).10 The group remained at the restaurant
for four to five hours and consumed several pitchers of beer." During the
course of the evening, the serving personnel of Valle's observed that
McCarthy and his friends were becoming intoxicated. 2 After drinking at
Valle's Restaurant, the group moved to another restaurant where they
consumed more alcohol." When the group left the second restaurant late
at night, McCarthy drove off in a car by himself, at a high rate of speed,
25-121(b) of the District of Columbia Code, which provides, in pertinent part, that no licensed
vendor of alcoholic beverages in the District of Columbia can provide alcoholic beverage to
an intoxicated person. Id. at 112-13; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121(b) (1981 & Supp. 1987)
(prohibiting tavern's sale of alcohol to intoxicated patron). The Norwood court concluded that
the statute regulates alcohol licensing and promotes public morality. Norwood, 780 F.2d at
11213. The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against
the defendant under section 25-121(b). Id. at 113. But see infra notes 60-70 and accompanying
text (North Carolina statute restricting sale of alcohol to intoxicated patron provides for third
party cause of action against dram shop).
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (West Supp. 1988) (creating third party cause of
action against tavern for third party injuries resulting from tavern's sale of alcohol to intoxicated
patron); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1987) (providing injured third party with
cause of action against any person selling or giving alcohol to drunken tortfeasor); Omo Rv.
CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Baldwin 1987) (same). Section 4399.01 of the Ohio Code provides in
full:
S. .ACTION AGAINST SELLER OF LIQUOR FOR INJURY CAUSED BY INTOXICATED PERSON
TO WHOM SALE IS PROHIBITED A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer,
or other person injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of a person,
after the issuance and during the existence of the order of the department of liquor
control prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor. . .to such person, has a right of
action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person selling or giving
intoxicating liquors which cause such intoxication, in whole or in part, of such
person.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Baldwin 1986).
7. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing courts' conflicting interpre-
tations of dram shop liability).
8. 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987).




13. Webb v. Regua Ltd. Partnership, 624 F. Supp. 471, 472 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd sub
nom., Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987). In Webb, after
leaving Valle's Restaurant, the defendant, John McCarthy, drove approximately one mile to
Chi-Chi's Restaurant. Id.
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in the wrong lane, and without turning on the lights of his car.' 4 A high-
speec, head-on collision followed, resulting in the death of Sharon Lee
Cooper.' 5 In addition to bringing suit against McCarthy,16 Cooper's admin-
istratrix brought a tort claim in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia against Valle's.1
7
The central issue before the district court was whether Valle's should
be liable to Cooper because the restaurant directly violated section 4-62(l)(c)
of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (the Act)." The Act makes
it a misdemeanor to sell alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.' 9 The
.district court in Webb recognized that Cooper was not a member of the
class that the legislature sought to protect when it enacted section 4-62(l)(c). 20
Thus the district court concluded that, in the absence of any controlling
legal precedent in Virginia, the plaintiff should not recover against the
restaurant. 2' The Webb court reasoned that under Virginia's common law,
14. Webb, 811 F.2d at 840.
15. Id. After the accident in Webb police determined that McCarthy had a blood alcohol
content of .303%. Id. Under Virginia law, a person who has a blood alcohol content of at
least .10% is legally drunk if that person operates a motor vehicle. VA. CODE AtN. § 18.2-266
(1982 & Supp. 1987).
16. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 472. In McCarthy's criminal proceedings, McCarthy pled
guilty to a charge of manslaughter and the Circuit Court of Fairfax County sentenced McCarthy
to five years in the penitentiary with four of the five years suspended. Id. Moreover, Cooper's
estate, in its civil action against McCarthy, recovered $45,103.00 in compensatory damages and
$100,000.00 punitive damages from McCarthy. Id.
17. Id. at 471-72. The plaintiff in Webb directed a civil action against Regua Limited
Partnership, the partnership that operated Valle's. Id. The parties, however, subsequently
agreed to transfer liability from Valle's Restaurant to Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., which
operates the Springfield Valle's pursuant to a license agreement. Webb, 811 F.2d at 840.
18. See Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 472-73 (district court determining whether Virginia Code
section 4-62()(c) of Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (the Act) creates private cause of action).
The Act provides, in pertinent part, that it is a misdemeanor for any person to sell alcoholic
beverages to a person who the seller knows or has reason to know is intoxicated. VA. CODE
ANN. § 4-62()(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
19. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 472-73.
20, See id. at 473 (Act does not create private cause of action). But see Corrigan v.
United States, 609 F. Supp. 720, 728-29 (E.D. Va. 1985) (section 4-62(l)(c) creates dram shop
liability cause of action), rev'd, 815 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1987). In Corrigan v. United States the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that conduct by a tavern
owner in violation of section 4-62()(c) of the Act gives an injured third person a cause of
action against a tavern owner. Id. Under the Act, the Corrigan court concluded, the injured
party had to show that the tortfeasor patron was on the tavern owner's premises and that
tavern served the patron alcoholic beverages there in spite of the patron's intoxicated state.
Id. at 729. In addition, the district court held that the plaintiff must show that the tavern
owner knew, or should have known, based upon industry ,standards, common experience, or
actual knowledge, that the patron was intoxicated. Id. The Corrigan court also required the
plaintiff to show that the dram shop personnel could have foreseen that the patron would
operate a motor vehicle after leaving the dram shop, and that the patron operated a motor
vehicle after leaving the dram shop. Id. Finally the Corrigan-court concluded that the injured
party had to show that the patron's drunk driving caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
21. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 472. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia noted in Webb that the Virginia Supreme Court had not imposed common-law
liability upon the seller of intoxicating liquors for the torts of intoxicated patrons. Id.
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Valle's was not liable because the consumption of alcohol, as opposed to
the sale of alcohol, was the proximate cause of an intoxicated person's
tortious conduct. 22 The district court maintained that section 4-62(l)(c) of
the Act does not create a cause of action against a seller of alcoholic
beverages for the negligent acts of the seller's patron. 23 Accordingly the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valle's, the defendant
dram shop. 24 The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
25
Noting that the Virginia Supreme Court's pending decision in William-
son v. Old Brogue, Inc.26 would determine Virginia's dram shop liability
law,27 the Fourth Circuit in Webb initially held the plaintiff's appeal of the.
district court's grant of summary judgment in abeyance. 28 In Williamson,
22. Id. In addition to concluding that Virginia common law did not recognize dram
shop liability, the district court in Webb also noted that the Circuit Court of Fairfax County
recently had denied liability to dram shops on three separate occasions. Id.; see Williamson
v. Loredo, No. 67180, slip op. at 2 (Va. 19th Cir. June 21, 1985) (common law relieves dram
shop of liability); Hutson v. Marshall Enters., Inc., No. 64409, slip op. at 2 (Va. 19th Cir.
June 20, 1985) (only drinking alcohol proximate cause of subsequent tortious conduct); Murphy
v. Olympic Flame Restaurant, Inc., No. 68764, slip op. at 2 (Va. 19th Cir. May 14, 1985)
(same). In addition, although not noted by the district court in Webb, the Circuit Court of
the City of Norfolk also earlier had denied dram shop liability in Bonavita v. Moore. See
Bonavita v. Moore, No. L-9501, slip op. at 4 (Va. Beach Cir. April 15, 1981) (recognizing that
under common-law act of drinking alcohol, not selling alcohol, causes injury to third parties).
23. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 473. The district court in Webb concluded that section 4-
62(l)(c) of the Act contains its own penalty provisions that the Virginia legislature enacted to
regulate only the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. Id.
24. Id.
25. Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987).
26. 232 Va. 350, 350 S.E.2d 621 (1986); see Webb, 811 F.2d at 841 (Fourth Circuit's
recognition of pending decision in Williamson).
27. Webb, 811 F.2d at 840-41. The Fourth Circuit in Webb recognized that a decision
of the Virginia Supreme Court is binding on the Fourth Circuit if the decision bears on a
diversity action that arose in Virginia, even though the court might have some reservations
concerning the Virginia Supreme Court's reasoning. Id. See Progressive Enters., Inc. v. New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 538 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir.) (federal court hearing a diversity
case is bound to apply state law even if federal court does not agree with state law), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976). See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal
courts are required to apply state law in diversity actions that do not involve federal questions
or statutes). In the absence of a Virginia Supreme Court decision, the district court and the
Fourth Circuit, before Williamson, only could look to section 4-62(1)(c) of the Act to find
any legislative activity expanding Virginia common law regarding dram shop liability. See
Webb v. Regua Ltd. Partnership, 624 F. Supp. 471, 472-73 (E.D. Va. 1985) (in addition to
scrutinizing language of statute, courts can review Virginia circuit court opinions for interpre-
tations of Virginia law), aff'd sub nom., Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d
840 (4th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 841. In holding the plaintiff's appeal of the district court's grant of summary
judgment in abeyance, the Fourth Circuit in Webb merely delayed its opinion in the expectation
that the Supreme Court of Virginia in Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc. would determine Virginia
law concerning dram shop liability. Webb, 811 F.2d at 840-41. See BALLENTn's LAW
DICTIONARY 3 (3d ed. 1969) (abeyance defined as expectation or contemplation of law); supra
note 27 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Webb bound to apply state law as determined
by Virginia Supreme Court in Williamson).
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as in Webb, the plaintiff brought suit against a dram shop for injuries the
plaintiff suffered as a result of the negligent conduct of the dram shop's
patron.29 The Fourth Circuit in Webb noted that the Williamson court
concluded that the alleged violation of section 4-62(1)(c) of the Act did not
constitute negligence per se.a0 The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that
the Act did not create a private cause of action because the Act specifically
was not directed towards benefitting individuals by increasing public safety.,
As a result the court in Williamson followed the common-law rules that
individuals are responsible for their own torts and that the drinking of the
intoxicant, not the sale of alcohol to the intoxicant, is the proximate cause
of a third party's injury.3 2 Subsequent to the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Williamson the Fourth Circuit in Webb affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant dram shop.
3
Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Webb relieved the defendant dram shop of
liability.1
4
29. Webb v. Regua Ltd. Partnership, 624 F. Supp. 471, 472 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd sub
nom., Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987); see Williamson v.
Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 351-52, 350 S.E.2d 621, 622 0986) (plaintiff bringing dram
shop cause of action). In Williamson the plaintiff alleged that the patron, Ethel Loredo, had
spent nearly four hours at The Old Brogue before her accident and, according to the tavern's
employees, had consumed large quantities of alcohol. Id. Upon leaving The Old Brogue,
Loredo drove off in an automobile, crossed the center line of a highway and collided head-
on with the plaintiff's vehicle, causing the plaintiff severe personal injuries. Id. The plaintiff
sought compensatory and punitive damages from the defendant dram shop for the injuries
caused by Loredo. Id.
30. Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1986); see
Williamson, 232 Va. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 625 (noting Williamson court's holding that violation
of § 4-62()(c) of Act does not create civil cause of action for dram shop plaintiff); see also
Harbour Enters., Inc. v. Ferro, 231 Va. 71, 74, 340 S.E.2d 818, 820 0986) (Act does not create
statutory tort liability); supra note 18 (summarizing text of § 4-62()(c) of the Virginia Act).
The Williamson court recognized that the overall purpose of the Act, which the Virginia
legislature passed in 1934, is to permit the legal possession of alcoholic beverages and to
prohibit and penalize illegal possession. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 624-25;
see Harbour Enters., Inc., 231 Va. at 74, 340 S.E.2d at 820 (purpose of § 4-620)(c) of Act is
to regulate and control sale, possession, and use of alcoholic beverages); Miller v. Common-
wealth, 172 Va. 639, 647, 2 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1939) (purpose of § 4-62()(c) of Act is to prohibit
illegal possession of alcoholic beverages).
31. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 625.
32. Id. at 623; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (act of consuming alcohol is
proximate cause of intoxicated's patron's tortious conduct). See also Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark.
889, -, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657 0965) (common law denies dram shop liability); Slicer v.
Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, -, 429 A.2d 855, 858 (1980) (holding that drinking alcohol, not
providing alcohol, proximately causes subsequent tortious conduct); Wright v. Moffitt, 437
A.2d 554, 555-56 (Del. 1981) (providing alcohol not proximate cause of intoxicated patron's
tortious conduct); Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 26-27, 237 S.E.2d 443, 444-45
(1977) (same); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, -, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969)
(same).
33. Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1987).
34. Id.
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While the Fourth Circuit was bound to apply the Williamson court's
reasoning to the facts in Webb,35 the confusing state of Virginia law prior
to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Williamson and the varied
interpretations of other courts within the Fourth Circuit 36 illustrate that
Webb is not consistent with other interpretations of dram shop liability
within the Fourth Circuit.37 In contrast to the Webb court's rejection of
dram shop liability, many state courts have abandoned the common-law
rule of not imposing liability on dram shops, even in the absence of dram
shop legislation.38 Moreover, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia in Corrigan v. United States39 interpreted Virginia law
prior to Webb and Williamson to allow an injured third party a cause of
action against a dram shop. 40 In Corrigan the guardian of a woman injured
by an intoxicated dram shop patron brought suit against the United States
for an alcohol-related accident.4' The accident, caused by a United States
serviceman, left the victim physically and mentally incapacitated.4 2 The
35. See id. (holding that Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Williamson mandates
affirmance of district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant dram shop);
supra note 27 and accompanying text (federal court bound to apply state law in diversity
cases).
36. Compare Corrigan v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 720, 728 (E.D. Va. 1985) (section
4-62(l)(c) of the Act) gives injured third party cause of action against tavern owner) rev'd,
815 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1987) with Webb v. Regua Ltd. Partnership, 624 F. Supp. 471, 473
(E.D. Va. 1985) (section 4-62(1)(c) of Act is not public safety measure and does not create a
third party dram shop liability cause of action), aff'd sub nom., Webb v. Blackie's House of
Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987).
37. See supra notes 20, 23, 36 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies of
Fourth Circuit decisions concerning dram shop liability); infra notes 60-70 and accompanying
text (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis of North Carolina's Act which makes sale of alcohol
to intoxicated person a misdemeanor).
38. Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1986); see,
e.g., Morris v. Farley Enter. 661 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Alaska 1983) (state statute restricting sale
of liquor to intoxicated persons allows court to abrogate common-law rule that only con-
sumption of alcohol causes subsequent injuries); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, -, 667
P.2d 200, 209-10 (1983) (same); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, -, 619 P.2d 135, 138-
39 (1980) (same); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627, 629 (Ky. 1968) (same); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201-02, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959) (statute restricting sale of alcohol to
intoxicated persons provides for dram shop liability cause of action); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M.
625, -, 651 P.2d 1269, 1275-76 (1982) (providing dram shop cause of action from statute
making sale of alcohol to intoxicated person a misdemeanor).
39. 609 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev'd, 815 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. Corrigan v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 720, 728-31 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev'd 815 F.2d
954 (4th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of
Corrigan court).
41. Corrigan, 609 F. Supp. at 723.
42. Id. In Corrigan the United States Army employed the intoxicated tortfeasor, Patrick
Patterson. Id. at 723. While at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California,
Patterson started regularly to consume alcohol and frequently drank until he became violent
or reckless. Id. at 723. Although the Army has an Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Program, and despite numerous alcohol-related incidents that gave the Army notice
that Patterson had alcohol problems, the Army never referred Patterson to the program as
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plaintiff alleged that the United States was negligent in serving an off-duty
serviceman alcoholic beverages at various military facilities because the
government should have known that the serviceman was underage and
intoxicated.4 3 The Corrigan court reasoned that section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act
protects not only the intoxicated person, but also members of the general
public." Additionally, the Corrigan court noted that thirty-eight states and
the District of Columbia recognized a dram shop liability cause of action.
4
1
The Corrigan court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did have both a
common-law cause of action founded in negligence and a cause of action
derived from the defendant's violation of section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act.
4 6
Accordingly, the court held the dram shop liable for the injuries that the
intoxicated serviceman inflicted upon the third party.
4 7
required by Army regulations. Id. at 724. When the Army relocated Patterson to Fort Meyer,
Virginia, he continued his drinking habits as a frequent patron of the Army's NCO Club. Id.
at 724-25. On December 19, 1981, Patterson began drinking in the afternoon at a snack bar at
Fort Meyer and then continued drinking at the Arlington Hall NCO Club. Id. at 725. After
nearly two hours at Arlington Hall, Patterson left the club alone and drove off in his car. Id.
at 726. Patterson first collided into another car on a road just outside of the club. Id.
Attempting to leave the scene of the accident, Patterson hit another car. Id. Patterson then
sped off with his headlights extinguished, failing to stop at stop signs, and driving in excess
of sixty miles per hour. Id. While running a stop sign, Patterson struck an automobile driven
by Mike McConnell. Id. The accident killed McConnell and knocked Maura Corrigan, a
passenger in the McConnell car, unconscious. Id. As a result of the accident, Maura Corrigan
suffered extensive brain injuries, manifested in a malfunctioning cerebral cortex and a severe
lesion in her brain stem. Id. at 727. Immediately following the accident Patterson's blood
alcohol level registered .26%. Id. at 726. Patterson's blood alcohol content indicated that he
must have consumed approximately seventeen ounces of eighty-proof alcohol, or about twelve
mixed drinks during the time he was at the Arlington Hall NCO club. Id. at 727. Because of
Corrigan's condition, the plaintiff incurred $256,846.79 in medical expenses. Id. at 728. In
addition, the plaintiffs estimated Corrigan's future medical costs at a minimum of $700,000.
Id. John Corrigan, as guardian of Maura Corrigan, entered a covenant not to sue Patrick
Patterson and received $25,000.00 from Patterson in consideration for the covenant. Id.
Because of this covenant, Corrigan primarily sought to recover against the United States
government on the grounds that the Army and the Arlington Hall NCO club were negligent
in serving Patterson an excessive amount of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 728-29.
43. Id. at 720.
44. Id. at 728-29. In Corrigan the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia recognized that, in addition to the terms of section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act, military
law prohibits military personnel from providing alcohol to intoxicated servicemen. Corrigan,
609 F. Supp. at 730.
45. Corrigan, 609 F. Supp. at 728, 729 n.6.
46. Id. at 728-29, 730. In thb district court's first review of Corrigan in 1984, the court
concluded that the Virginia legislature's failure to enact dram shop legislation expressed the
legislature's recognition that Virginia courts would automatically follow the majority of state
courts and recognize common-law dram shop liability. Corrigan v. United States, 595 F. Supp.
1047, 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984), rev'd, 815 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1987).
47. Corrigan, 609 F. Supp. at 730. In holding the government liable for the injuries an
intoxicated patron inflicted on a third party, the Corrigan court cautioned that bartenders
would not have to administer specific sobriety tests to each individual patron. Id. at 731.
Rather, the Corrigan court concluded that the law imposes upon the dram shop only the duty
to exercise reasonable care in looking for signs that would indicate a customer's intoxication.
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Fourteen months after deciding Corrigan, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia applied Virginia state law in an altogether
different manner to the similar circumstances of Webb s.4 The district court
in Webb referred to its earlier discussions of section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act
in Corrigan49 but concluded that the Act is a self-contained statute that has
its own penalty provisions, through which the legislature only sought to
regulate the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. 0 In addition, the
district court in Webb deferred to Virginia common law as defined by
recent state circuit courts that deny dram shop liability.5 ' Without enumer-
ating its reasons for abandoning the Corrigan court's interpretation of
section 4-62(1)(c) of the Act, the district court in Webb concluded that in
Virginia there would be no liability on a seller of intoxicating beverages for
injuries that the seller's customers inflict on third parties.52 In disregarding
Corrigan, the district court in Webb concluded that dram shop liability for
third party injuries was a matter best addressed by the Virginia General
Assembly.5 a
Just as the district court in Webb did not explain its departure from
Corrigan, the Virginia Supreme Court in Williamson also did not reconcile
the differences between the district court's earlier interpretations of Virginia
dram shop liability law. 54 Echoing the district court's reasoning in Webb,
the Williamson court held that a violation of section 4-62(c)(1) of the Act
could not constitute negligence per se because the plaintiff was not a member
of the class for whose benefit the legislature enacted the law. 5  The only
Id. Thus, the Corrigan court determined that to prevail under common-law dram shop liability
in Virginia, a plaintiff must show that the dram shop knew or should have known of the
patron's intoxication at the time the dram shop served the patron. Id.
48. See Webb v. Regua Ltd. Partnership, 624 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Va. 1985) (acknowl-
edging district court's prior decision to impose dram shop liability in Corrigan), aff'd sub
nom., Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 811 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 472-73. In Webb the district court acknowledged the reasonableness of its
prior holding in Corrigan. Id. The district court in Webb called the previous decision a well-
written and well-reasoned opinion. Id.
50. Id. at 473.
51. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 473; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting Virginia
state circuit courts' decisions that deny common-law dram shop liability cause of action).
52. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 473; see supra notes 20, 23, 36 accompanying text (discussing
district court's disagreement in Webb with its prior decision in Corrigan to establish common-
law dram shop liability).
53. Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 473.
54. Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (1986);
Webb, 624 F. Supp. at 472-73. The Williamson court recognized that only one federal district
court sitting in Virginia recently refused to follow the common-law rule that denies dram shop
liability. Williamson, 232 Va. at 353, 350 S.E.2d at 623-24; see supra notes 40-47 (discussing
Corrigan). In addition, the Williamson court noted that another federal court applied Virginia's
common-law rule that only the act of consuming alcohol proximately causes the injuries
suffered by a third party. Williamson, 232 Va. at 353, 350 S.E.2d at 623-24.
55. See Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 624 (Act not public safety legislation
and therefore provides no individual cause of action for violation thereof). See also Webb,
624 F. Supp. at 473 (Act only aimed at controlling distribution of alcohol).
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purpose of the Act, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded, was to encourage
public sobriety and moderation of an individual's alcohol consumption.1
6
The Williamson court concluded, therefore, that the Virginia legislature did
not intend section 4-62(l)(c) to create a third party cause of action against
a supplier of alcohol s7 As a result the Williamson court refused to hold
the defendant dram shop liable.
58
The Fourth Circuit in Webb was bound to apply Virginia law in
accordance with the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of Virginia law
in Williamson."9 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Webb to deny dram shop
liability, however, directly conflicts with the Fourth Circuit's earlier inter-
pretation of North Carolina law in Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc.'3
Chastain involved an employer-employee relationship between a supplier of
alcohol and a drunken tortfeasor.6 1 The underlying issue in Chastain focused
on the potential liability of a company for supplying alcohol to intoxicated
persons who later injure innocent third parties. 62 The Fourth Circuit scru-
tinized North Carolina common law and statutory law as the Fourth Circuit
felt the North Carolina Supreme Court would interpret North Carolina
statutory and common law.63 The Chastain court determined that North
Carolina General Statutes section 18B-305(a), the equivalent of Virginia
Code section 4-62()(c),64 establishes safety regulations that impose a duty
on a liquor licensee to protect the public and the consumer of alcoholic
56. Williamson, 232 Va. at 356, 350 S.E.2d at 625. In scrutinizing the purposes of
section 4-62()(c) of the Act, the Williamson court concluded that the state enacted the Act
pursuant to its police powers to preserve the safety, health, and well-being of Virginia's
communities. Id.; see also Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 316, 24 S.E.2d 550, 554
(1943) (section 4-62()(c) of Act intended to protect health and safety of communities), aff'd,
321 U.S. 131 0944). Thus, the Williamson court concluded that section 4-62()(c) of the Act
was not a public safety measure; rather, the purpose of the legislation was to achieve public
sobriety and individual moderation. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 625.
57. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 625.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (federal court sitting in diversity bound to
apply state law).
60. 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983).
61. Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957, 959 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1106 (1983). In Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., George Beck, an employee of
defendant Litton Systems, left a party that his employer sponsored, drove through a red light,
and struck Marilyn Chastain's car. Id. The collision killed Chastain. Id. The administrator of
Chastain's estate brought suit against Litton Systems because Beck had become intoxicated at
a Litton Systems Christmas party. Id. The Christmas party began in the morning on Litton
Systems' business premises and continued through the company's normal working hours.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 960-61. The Fourth Circuit in Chastain ascertained North Carolina's common-
law policy toward alcoholic beverage dispensers to determine how the North Carolina Supreme
Court would decide dram shop issues. Id.
64. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a) (1983) (unlawful for licensed vendor of
alcoholic beverages knowingly to sell alcoholic beverages to any intoxicated person) with VA.
CODE ANN. § 4-62()(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (misdemeanor for sale of alcoholic beverages to
intoxicated person).
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beverages. 65 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit recognized that North Carolina
courts have held that a violation of a statute that creates a public duty
constitutes negligence per se.66 The Chastain court thus concluded that the
North Carolina Supreme Court would impose civil liability on a liquor
licensee who violated a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages
to an intoxicated person. 67 Although the defendant in Chastain was not a
dram shop,6 the Fourth Circuit maintained that section 18B-305(a) of the
North Carolina General Statutes discloses a state policy of civil liability for
violations of section 18B-305(a) towards all persons who provide alcoholic
beverages in capacities other than as social hosts. 69 Thus the Fourth Circuit
concluded in Chastain that an injured third party who is the victim of an
intoxicated dram shop patron has a cause of action against the dram shop. 70
In the absence of specific legislation holding dram shops liable for the
conduct of intoxicated dram shop patrons, some state courts have been
reluctant to impose dram shop liability for fear of encroaching on legislative
powers. 7' In Chastain, however, the Fourth Circuit was willing to read
North Carolina General Statutes section 18B-305(a) as a legislative mandate
to protect dram shop patrons and the general public from the consequences
of an intoxicated person's conduct.7 2 Similarly, a majority of state courts
also have determined that statutes regulating the sale of alcohol to intoxi-
cated persons indicate that present legislation which provides for a third
party cause of action against a dram shop encompasses a legislative desire
to protect the public from intoxicated persons. 7 In only one instance has a
65. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 961.
66. Id. In Chastain the Fourth Circuit determined that North Carolina courts recognize
that a violation of a municipal ordinance that imposes a public duty and protects life and
limb is negligence per se. Id.; see Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 399, 156 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1967)
(violating public safety statute is negligence per se). However, to impose liability, the Chastain
court concluded, the plaintiff must establish that such a violation proximately caused the
plaintiff's alleged injury. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 961.
67. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 961.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (defendant company in Chastain served
alcohol to company's intoxicated employee).
69. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 961.
70. Id. at 962-63. In holding that an injured third party may sue an alcohol-supplying
dram shop, the Chastain court determined that the jury should make factual determinations,
including the extent of the dispenser's negligence, potential intervening negligence, vicarious
tort concerns and proximate cause. Id.
71. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 354, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986)
(noting that if issues involve many competing economic, societal, and policy considerations,
legislative procedures and safeguards are particularly for fashioning appropriate modifications
to existing common law); supra note 30 and accompanying text (courts are unwilling to create
dram shop liability if legislature did not intend to enact public safety legislation).
72. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 960-61; see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (Chastain
court concludes North Carolina Act enacted for public safety concerns and that violation
thereof constitutes negligence per se).
73. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 961. See Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 161-62, 486 P.2d 151,
157, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1971) (discussing early cases abrogating or modifying common-
law rule that drinking, not serving alcohol, is proximate cause of third-party injury); supra
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state legislature clarified or expanded its intention to deny dram shop liability
after a state court interpreted alcohol supply and consumption legislation
to provide for dram shop liability. 74 Thus the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of North Carolina's alcohol consumption statute in Chastain was in line
with a majority of other state court holdings.
71
Because the Fourth Circuit was required to adhere to Williamson in
Webb, the Virginia Supreme Court placed the Fourth Circuit in the position
of having to interpret nearly identical North Carolina and Virginia statutes
and arrive at opposite conclusions.76 The Virginia Supreme Court in Wil-
liamson expressed reluctance to establish dram shop liability, especially
absent legislation that specifically defines dram shop liability.7 7 While the
Virginia Supreme Court based its decision in Williamson, in part, on Virginia
state circuit courts of appeal decisions,78 the Virginia Supreme Court im-
properly disregarded other Virginia precedent that may have drawn Virgi-
nia's application of dram shop liability closer to the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of similar North Carolina law that established dram shop
liability.
notes 36, 38 and accompanying text (various jurisdictions recognize dram shop duty to protect
general public from intoxicated dram shop patrons).
74. See Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. In Vesely v.
Sager the California Supreme Court interpreted California Business and Professional Code
section 25602 to determine whether the statute, which makes it a misdemeanor for a tavern
to sell alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, creates a dram shop liability cause of
action for an injured third party. Id.; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985)
(prohibiting sale of alcohol to intoxicated person). The Vesely Court noted that section 25602
makes a tavern's sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated patron a misdemeanor, thus
protecting members of the general public from personal and property damages that result
from a person's excessive consumption of alcohol. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159,
95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985) (section making it
a misdemeanor in California to sell alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person). Accordingly,
the court recognized that the furnishing of alcohol to an intoxicated person may be the
proximate cause of damage created by that patron. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 486 P.2d at
160, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. Because section 25602 of the California Business and Professions
Code creates a tavern's duty of care to the intoxicated patron and the public, the Vesely court
held that the defendant dram shop was liable to the injured third party for violating section
25602. Id.
Seven years subsequent to Vesely, the California legislature antiquated Vesely by amending
section 25602 to expressly declare that no person supplying alcohol to an intoxicated person
can be civilly liable for any injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person upon others. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 25602(b),(c) (West 1985).
75. See supra notes 38, 73 and accompanying text (majority of courts interpret statutes
prohibiting sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons as providing for dram shop liability cause
of action).
76. See supra notes 29-32, 60-70 and accompanying text (conflicting interpretations of
North Carolina and Virginia statutes in Williamson and Chastain).
77. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 355-56, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624-25
0986) ( Williamson court interpreting Act as controlling alcohol distribution but not providing
for public safety).
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing state circuit court decisions
rejecting dram shop liability in light of common-law principle that only drinking of alcohol
causes third party injuries).
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Prior to Corrigan, Williamson, and Webb, Virginia's highest court
expressed a desire to prevent intoxicated persons from driving automobiles.
7 9
In Crowell v. Duncan0 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia announced
Virginia's adherence to the theory of negligent entrustment.81 Under the
theory of negligent entrustment, an injured person can recover against a
person who lends property to an individual who uses that property to cause
foreseeable injury.82 In Crowell the injured plaintiff brought suit against
the tortfeasor's father on the ground that the father, knowing that his son
had reckless driving habits and a drinking problem, permitted his son to
drive the father's automobile. 83 The Crowell court recognized that the son's
drinking caused the son's reckless driving that in turn caused the plaintiff's
injury.84 The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the father knew,
or at least should have known, that his son's drinking habits could cause
harm to third parties if the son attempted to drive.8 5 The Crowell court
thus did not hesitate to hold the father responsible for his son's negligence
because the court found that the father was put on notice of the potential
harm to his son or others if the father did not take steps to prevent his
frequently reckless son from driving while under the influence of alcohol.8 6
79: See infra notes 80-87, 93 and accompanying text (discussing Crowell v. Duncan, in
which Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held defendant father liable for torts of frequently
intoxicated son because father placed son in position of driving while intoxicated).
80. 145 Va. 489, 134 S.E. 576 0926).
81. See Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 510, 134 S.E. 576, 582 (1926) (Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals applies negligent entrustment theory where father knew of son's reckless
driving habits and proclivity to drink yet placed son in position of driving automobile
nonetheless).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965) (defining doctrine of negligent
entrustment). Virginia's adherence to the doctrine of negligent entrustment as initiated in
Crowell, has lasted approximately 61 years. See Bell v. Hudgins, 232 Va. 491, 495, 352 S.E.2d
332, 334 (1987) (recognizing Crowell court's negligent entrustment theory still valid theory);
Crowell, 145 Va. 489 at 510, 134 S.E.2d at 582 (recognition of negligent entrustment theory).
83. Crowell, 145 Va. at 495, 134 S.E.at 576-77. John Duncan, the plaintiff in Crowell,
proceeded against the tortfeasor's father on two separate theories of liability. Id. Duncan first
alleged that J.W. Crowell, the father, had hired his son, Bruce Crowell, to drive the father's
taxi and that the accident causing Duncan's injuries arose while Bruce Crowell was acting
within the scope of his authority as his father's agent. Id. Duncan's second cause of action
proceeded on a negligent entrustment theory, alleging that J.W. Crowell negligently permitted
Bruce Crowell to drive the automobile while intoxicated because the father allegedly knew of
his son's drinking habits and reckless driving tendencies. Id.
84. Crowell, 145 Va. at 507-10, 134 S.E. at 582.
85. See id. (because automobile accidents are frequent and foreseeable result of drinking
and driving, one who loans car has duty to prevent borrower of car from driving while
intoxicated). In holding the tortfeasor's father liable for the plaintiff's injuries, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in Crowell reasoned that:
incompetence, recklessness, and accident are so universally the sequel of drinking
that an owner of an automobile is put on notice of what is likely to occur if he
does not take active steps to prevent any one addicted to drinking from driving it.
If he fails in the performance of this duty, he should suffer the consequences of his
neglect.
Crowell, 145 Va. at 510, 134 S.E. at 582.
86. Id. at 510-11, 134 S.E. at 582.
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The Crowell court recognized that recklessness and potential danger to the
community follow from allowing an individual to drive while intoxicated.
8 7
Like the Crowell court's application of negligent entrustment, other courts'
applications of dram shop liability recognize that the tavern that allows an
intoxicated person to continue drinking should foresee the potential harm
that the drunken patron could cause to the community, especially if the
tavern allows an intoxicated patron to drive an automobile.
88
In Williamson the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Crowell
court's negligent entrustment standard did not apply. 89 The Williamson
court concluded that the Crowell court's application of the doctrine of
negligent entrustment did not require modification of common-law rules
because of the special master-servant relationship in Crowell.9 The William-
son court refused to apply Crowell because negligent entrustment specifically
deals with the owner of an automobile who lends his car to a tortfeasor. 9'
Although Crowell addressed the issue of actual notice of potential harm
given to the owner of an automobile,9 2 the import of the Crowell decision
is that an individual who knowingly allows an intoxicated person to drive
an automobile should suffer the consequences. 93 The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals decided Crowell eight years before the Virginia legislature
adopted section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act.94 Thus, when the Virginia legislature
enacted section 4-62()(c), Virginia courts already had recognized the state's
concern for the relationship between drinking and driving. 95 The Virginia
Supreme Court in Williamson determined that section 4-62(l)(c) did not
embody a legislative mandate to provide injured third parties with a cause
of action against dram shops that sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
87. Id.
88. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959) (innkeeper in
position to recognize intoxicated person and to foresee harm potentially caused when intoxicated
patron subsequently drives automobile); supra note 38 and accompanying text (tavern owner
can foresee consequences of patron's drunk driving).
89. Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 356, 350 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1986); see
Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 510, 134 S.E. 576, 582 (1926) (Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals' recognition of negligent entrustment theory).
90. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 356, 350 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1986)
(noting that father in Crowell liable for son's tort primarily because of father's position as
master, not because of public policy of holding supplier of alcohol liable for damages by
intoxicated person for public safety reasons).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 510, 134 S.E. 576, 582 (1926) (basing negligence
determinations on public policy of deterring foreseeable injuries to third parties that directly
result from drinking and driving if supplier of alcohol knows of driver's intoxicated state).
94. See supra notes 30 and 80 ( Crowell decided in 1926, legislature enacted Act in 1934).
95. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986)
(discussing concern for highway fatalities and injuries caused by drunk driving); supra notes
83-87, 93 (discussing Virginia's conceri for accidents foreseeably resulting from drinking and
driving).
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persons. 96 Yet the Crowell decision announced Virginia's concern to protect
the public from drunk-driving accidents. 97
In Webb v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. the Fourth Circuit applied
Virginia law as the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted in Williamson98 and
refused to hold a dram shop liable for injuries that a dram shop patron
inflicted on a third party29 When the Fourth Circuit in Chastain interpreted
a similar North Carolina statute as scrutinized in Williamson, the court
interpreted the North Carolina statute to provide for dram shop liability. 1' °
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation in Chastain of North Carolina law as
providing for a dram shop liability cause of action was consistent with the
holdings of most other jurisdictions that have scrutinized alcohol distribution
statutes.10' Although other jurisdictions have specific dram shop liability
statutes, 0 2 the Virginia state legislature has not clearly expressed an intent
to provide an injured third party with a cause of action against a dram
shop. 0 3 Therefore, courts applying Virginia law regarding dram shop liability
have had latitude in which to interpret section 4-62(l)(c) of the Act, which
makes selling alcohol to an intoxicated customer a misdemeanor.'0 4 Citizen
groups, legislators and courts have recognized the dangers inherent in
drinking and driving. 0 As each group strives to deter drunk driving, courts
96. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 625. In Williamson the crucial question,
according the Virginia Supreme Court, was whether the person injured by the intoxicated
customer of a dram shop was a member of the class of persons that section 4-62(1)(c) of the
Act sought to protect. Id. See generally Smith v. Virginia Transit Co., 206 Va. 951, 147 S.E.2d
110 (1966) (focusing on whether plaintiff was member of class that statute protected). The
Virginia Supreme Court based its decision to deny dram shop liability on the principal purposes
of the Act. Williamson, 232 Va. at 355-56, 350 S.E.2d at 625. The Act, the Williamson court
concluded, only addressed the lawful distribution of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 355-56, 350
S.E.2d at 624-25. But see Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 510, 134 S.E. 576, 582 (1926)
(recognizing that incompetence, recklessness and potential disaster to community are conse-
quences of allowing one to drive while intoxicated); supra notes 80-82, 85 (accidents are
foreseeable consequence of drunk driving).
97. See supra notes 80-87, 93 and accompanying text (discussing Crowell court's use of
negligent entrustment to impose liability and thus deter drunk driving).
98. See supra notes 23, 30, 56 and 71 and accompanying text (recognizing that Virginia
does not recognize dram shop liability under common law and that statutes restricting sales
of alcoholic beverages to individuals only protect state's control of distribution of alcohol).
99. See supra notes 27, 35 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Webb follows
Williamson in denying dram shop liability).
100. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Chastain holds
statute restricting sale of alcohol to intoxicated person enacted for public safety protection
and thus provides for cause of action against dram shop).
101. See supra notes 38, 73 and accompanying text (majority of courts interpreting alcohol
distribution statute similar to Virginia's Act find cause of action against dram shop).
102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (examples of statutes providing for dram
shop liability cause of action).
103. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's only statutory authority
that deals with relationship between dram shop and intoxicated patron).
104. See supra notes 20, 23, 36, 49, 52 and accompanying text (courts interpreting Virginia
law have arrived at contradictory conclusions regarding dram shop liability).
105. See supra notes 1, 2, 85, 93, 96 and accompanying text (discussing public and judicial
concern for consequences of drinking and driving).
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consistently can analyze dram shop liability concerns if states adhering to
common-law principles, like Virginia, statutorily define or denounce dram
shop tort liability.'16
WADE MAtTHEW FlucKE
106. See supra notes 6, 74 and accompanying text (discussing specific legislative actions
clarifying dram shop liability concerns).
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